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A. THE CONDICTIO OB TURPEM CAUSAM IN CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 
I. The Function of the Condictio in Roman Law 
The condictio is best viewed in the light of the rei vindicatio.1 The rei 
vindicatio was a claim in the law of property. It enabled the owner of a certain 
thing (certum) to claim this certum from any possessor who did not have a 
right of retention over it. However, as soon as the owner transferred the 
ownership to the possessor (dare, datio), the rei vindicatio was no longer 
available: being a claim in the law of property, the rei vindicatio presupposed 
that the pursuer was the owner of the thing claimed. However, the fact that 
ownership passed does not necessarily mean that the transferee was entitled to 
the benefit. The law of property may thus trigger rigid results since, according 
to the law of property, ownership may pass, and the rei vindicatio cease, even 
though the transferee may not have a right to retain the benefits according to 
other rules of civil law. This rigidity of the law of property is mitigated to an 
extent by the law of obligations. The Roman jurists allowed recovery if the 
transferee, for certain reasons the jurists had developed, did not have a legal 
reason to retain the property (causa). In these cases, certain actions were 
granted to reverse the transfer; thereby, the results of the law of property 
which were seen to be unfair were corrected. So, for instance, recovery was 
permitted if the transferor’s intention had been vitiated in some important 
manner when he transferred ownership, as, for example, where he had paid a 
sum of money under error as to legal liability towards the transferee. Thus, the 
law of property is closely interlaced with what we call today the law of 
unjustified enrichment, the latter operating to moderate legally unacceptable 
results of the former.  
 
1 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 841 sq.; Kaser, RP I, pp. 592 sq.; 
Reuter/Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), § 1 I 1 b (pp. 6 sq.). 
3 R. Meyer-Spasche University of Aberdeen 
 
 
The jurists granted the condictio as a means to allow recovery of benefits 
transferred under certain conditions.2 Originally, condicere meant denuntiare, 
i.e. to announce a <6> judicial date3: in the early times of the formal legis 
actiones4 the action for recovery of a certain thing (certum dare) was 
introduced with a formal announcement of the pursuer before the praetor, 
saying that the defender had to appear in foro after thirty days for the 
appointment of a judge. When the legis actiones had fallen into disuse, the 
terms condicere and condictio continued to be used generally of a claim 
certum dare.5 According to Otto Lenel6, the remedy that was given by the 
praetor was the actio certae creditae pecuniae where it was a certain sum of 
money that was claimed, or the actio certae rei where a certain thing was 
claimed from the defender. The formula of the actio certae creditae pecuniae 
ran as follows7: 
    
 
2 D. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: N. MacCormick/P. 
Birks (eds.), The Legal Mind – Essays for Tony Honoré (1986), 163. The condictio was the 
oldest and most important but not the only action in this context. In cases where the condictio 
did not lie the praetor developed actiones in id quod ad eum pervenit or quanto locupletior 
factus est to allow recovery. See Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz (1915), pp. 88 sqq.; 
G. H. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen (1932), pp. 1 sqq., and below notes 86, 91. 
<6> 
3 Gai., Inst. 4.17a. 
4 On the early procedure of legis actiones see in detail Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 34 sqq. 
5 I. 4.6.15. See Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 835; Kaser, RP I, p. 593, and 
Reuter/Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), § 1 I 1 b (p. 6). – The scope of the 
condictio was probably already in classical times expanded to certain narrow cases where an 
incertum was claimed: Kaser, RP I, pp. 598 sqq. with references. 
6 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 237, 240; Lenel, loc. cit., p. 234, 
states that in classical times the actio was not yet called condictio certi.  
7 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 237.  
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 Titius iudex esto. 
Intentio Si paret Nm Nm Ao Ao sestertium 
decem milia dare oportere, 
Condemnatio iudex, Nm Nm Ao Ao sestertium decem 
milia condemnato. 
 Si non paret absolvito. 
  
 Titius shall be judge. 
Intentio If it is proved that the defender 
Numerius Negidius has to give ten 
thousand sestertii to the pursuer Aulus 
Agerius, 
Condemnatio you, judge, shall condemn Numerius 
Negidius to give ten thousand sestertii 
to Aulus Agerius. 
 If it is not proved you shall free him. 
 
According to Lenel's reconstruction, the formula of the actio certae rei named 
the thing claimed instead of the sum of money but was, apart from that, 
identical.8 <7> 
1. Overview of the Roman Civil Procedure 
In order fully to understand the significance of the actio certae creditae 
pecuniae and the actio certae rei, a brief outline of the Roman civil procedure 
should be given. Classical Roman law was highly determined by procedural 
means.9 The procedure was divided between the praetor (in foro) and the 
iudex (apud iudicem). The key position was held by the praetor, a magistrate 
who had the power to grant procedural formulae. The praetor listened to the 
pursuer's demand as well as to the defender's objection. If he came to the 
 
8 For instance: Si paret Nm Nm Ao Ao tritici Africi optimi modios centum dare oportere, 
quanti ea res est, tantam pecuniam Nm Nm Ao Ao condemnato. – If it is proved that the 
defender Numerius Negidius has to give one hundred measures of best African wheat to the 
pursuer Aulus Agerius, you, judge, shall <7> condemn Numerius Negidius to pay the value of 
this to Aulus Agerius. Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 239 sq. 
9 On the following see E. Metzger, "Actions", in: E. Metzger (ed.), A Companion to 
Justinian's Institutes (1998), 208 (pp. 212 sqq.); Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 151 sqq.; Lenel, Das 
Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 14 sqq.; Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), pp. 256, 257 
sq. 
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conclusion that the pursuer's demand was actionable because there was an 
appropriate cause of action he granted a formula.  
Such a formula had a certain structure.10 First, a judge was selected. He 
was in charge of evidence and of reaching the final judgment. Then followed 
the demonstratio where the facts of the case were described; this clause might 
be omitted when the facts were not complicated. The intentio expressed the 
aim of the claim; for instance to recover a certain thing (certum dare oportere 
or sestertium milia decem dare oportere). Thus, the intentio determined the 
nature of the action.11  
The important point about these formulae was that the existence of a 
formula determined the success of the pursuer's claim in the sense that if there 
was no formula that fitted the submitted facts, there was no action12 and the 
pursuer could not enforce his demand. There were as many kinds of actions as 
there were different kinds of intentiones.13 This shows that the Romans 
thought not so much in terms of material rights but rather in terms of 
remedies. The formulae were published in the praetor's edictum perpetuum.14 
<8> 
2. Actio Certae Creditae Pecuniae and Actio Certae Rei 
The actio certae creditae pecuniae and the actio certae rei did not mention the 
causa, that is the ground of the claim. Their formulae were abstract.15 To take 
the example of the actio certae creditae pecuniae, the formula did not say why 
the ten thousand sestertii were due. Therefore, this formula could be used for a 
wide range of cases where a certum dare, i.e. the transfer of a certain sum of 
money, or a certain thing in the case of the actio certae rei, was claimed.16 At 
first, the formula was used for actions ex certa stipulatione and ex causa 
 
10 Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 310 sqq. 
11 Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 258. 
12 In cases where not giving an action would have contradicted equity the praetor had the 
competence of creating new formulae in factum or utiles; he intervened adiuvandi vel 
supplendi vel corrigendi gratia (Pap. D. 1.1.7.1). See E. Metzger, "Actions", in: E. Metzger 
(ed.), A Companion to Justinian's Institutes (1998), 208 (pp. 220 sqq.); Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 
328 sqq., 238. 
13 Sohm, op. cit., note 11 above. 
14 See Otto Lenel's reconstruction of the edictum perpetuum (Lenel, Das Edictum 
Perpetuum [3rd ed., 1927]). <8> 
15 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 835 sq.; Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd 
ed., 1927), p. 237; Kaser, RP I, p. 593. 
16 Siber, Römisches Recht II (1928), p. 15; Kaser, RP I, p. 593; Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, p. 836. 
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furtiva. It was then expanded to cases where a loan was claimed back (ex 
mutuo) as well as to literal contracts. Finally, the Roman jurists identified 
certain cases of unjustified retention of a certum that were analogous to the 
established cases and granted the condictio on grounds of this analogy.17 
However, it is important to note that despite the abstract formula of the 
condictio there was no general claim in classical Roman law to recover a thing 
that was retained without legal reason (causa) by a transferee.18 The Roman 
jurists rather identified a number of different cases based on narrow legal 
classifications to determine whether recovery was to be allowed or not.19 Thus 
several groups of cases were recognised in which the condictio was given, 
such as the condictio indebiti, the condictio ob rem and the condictio ob 
turpem causam.  
The last mentioned cause of action applied to cases where benefits had 
been transferred under transactions involving turpitude. In order to explain the 
special function of the condictio ob turpem causam within the Roman system 
of the condictio and its relationship with the condictio ob rem and the 
condictio indebiti, it is necessary to understand the relationship of the 
condictio with the Roman law of contracts. <9> 
II. The Condictio and the Roman Law of Contracts 
1. The Roman Contractual System 
In Roman law, there was a numerus clausus of contractual types.20 That means 
that only certain types of contracts were recognised and legally enforceable. In 
Sohm's apt words21: "A contract in the Roman sense is not any declaration of 
consensus that is intended to create an obligation, but only a declaration of 
consensus that results in an obligation actionable by the civil law." Only if 
there was a formula by which the agreement could be enforced was there 
 
17 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 836 sq.; Kaser, RP I, pp. 593, 525. Cf. Gai., 
Inst. 3.91. 
18 Reuter/Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), § 1 I 1 b (p. 7) and c (pp. 8 
sqq.); G. H. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen (1932), p. 1; Honsell, Rückabwicklung 
(1974), p. 66; cf. Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1961), pp. 610 sqq., against Sanfilippo, 
Condictio indebiti, Il fondamento dell' obligazione da indebito (1943), pp. 56 sqq. 
19 Kaser, RP I, pp. 596 sqq. <9> 
20 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 70. 
21 Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 372. 
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thought to be a contract. Thus, four different categories of contracts were 
recognised: consensual contracts, real contracts, verbal and literal contracts.22  
a) Consensual contracts were, as suggested by the name, concluded 
through consensus alone (nudo consensu) without the necessity of observing a 
certain form. Under this category came, for instance, sale (emptio venditio), 
rent and service contracts (locatio conductio), mandate (mandatum) and 
partnership (societas).23  
b) The sine qua non for a real contract was the agreed transfer of property 
to the transferee; the pure consensus of the parties to the transfer was not by 
itself sufficient to create an actionable obligation. Examples are loan (mutuum) 
and deposit (depositum).24 So, if the parties only consented to a loan of money, 
the receiver of the promise had no remedy to enforce the agreement. The giver 
was not obliged to transfer the promised sum. As soon as the giver did transfer 
the money, however, an obligation was created: the recipient was obliged to 
pay the money back. This obligation was actionable with the actio certae 
creditae pecuniae - with the same formula as mentioned above.25 The reason 
why this formula could be used also in this kind of case was that it only 
expressed the fact that there was an obligation to return a certain sum. This 
obligation was created by the objective act of handing over money. In this 
respect it did not differ from the payment of an indebitum. So in both cases the 
actio certae creditae pecuniae <10> lay.26 This illustrates the abstract nature 
of this formula and the Roman way of thinking in procedural terms. 
c) Verbal and literal contracts presupposed the observation of a certain 
form to create a valid obligation. To be obliged by a stipulatio, the contract 
had to be concluded in the form of oral question and answer, using the same 
verb. A literal contract derived from an entry in the expense book of the 
paterfamilias.27 
 
22 Gai., Inst. 3.89; Siber, Römisches Recht II (1928), p. 170; Kaser, RP I, pp. 524 sqq.; 
Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 372. 
23 Kaser, RP I, p. 526; Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 70. 
24 Kaser, RP I, p. 525; Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 372; Honsell, Rückabwicklung 
(1974), pp. 70 sq. 
25 Kaser, RP I, p. 525. <10> 
26 Gai., Inst. 3.91; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 837; Kaser, RP I, p. 525; 
Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), p. 253. 
27 See Kaser, RP I, pp. 525 and 168 sqq.; Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th 
ed., 1987), pp. 295 sqq. and 251 sq. 
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2. The Interplay of the Law of Contracts and the Condictio 
The Roman condictio worked in conjunction with the understanding of the law 
of contracts. In this context, the condictio indebiti and the condictio ob rem 
had clear functions to fulfil which complemented each other.  
As described earlier, there was only a limited number of enforceable 
contracts. Within a contract, if a payment was made that was not due for some 
reason, say the contract was void ab initio, the condictio indebiti was available 
to recover what was not due.28 So, when a payment was made to discharge an 
obligation that was thought to derive from a contract, the Roman jurists 
applied the condictio indebiti.29 
However, in cases where something was given that fell outwith the 
recognised types of contract, the condictio indebiti could not lie because the 
payment or transfer was not made to discharge an obligation. The transfer 
itself was not enforceable since there was no formula for this situation, and 
thus there was no legal obligation to be discharged by the transfer. Such a 
transfer outwith contract was called datio ob rem.30 In this context one could 
understand res to denote what was given with the purpose of obtaining a 
counter-performance.31 So the giver paid (datio) in expectation of a certain 
behaviour or counter-performance by the recipient (ob rem). A contrast to the 
datio ob rem would be a gift (donatio), i.e. a transfer of value which does not 
envisage any counter-performance but is carried out animo donandi.32 On the 
other hand, if the donor <11> intended to evoke certain behaviour from the 
donee and therefore subjected the donatio to a corresponding condition the 
condictio ob rem was available to recover the donated benefits if the donee did 
not fulfill this condition.33 In this context, the datio is made in expectance of 
the fulfilment of the condition (ob rem). A datio ob rem could generally be 
any act that was not made under the terms of a contract, say under a sale or 
lease.34 Examples are a payment made for the purpose of freeing a slave of the 
 
28 Kaser, RP I, p. 596; see there note 36 on the controversial question of the condictio 
indebiti and its relation to error, with references. 
29 Justinian compiled these cases mainly in book twelve, title six of the Digest. 
30 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 842 sq.; Schwarz, Condictio (1952), pp. 
117 sqq.; Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 73 sqq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 597. 
31 Cf. to the wide-ranging use of res Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1891), pp. 464 sqq.; 
on the use which applies here see p. 466 no. 5. 
32 Ulp. D. 39.5.19.5 sq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 601. <11> 
33 Ulp. D. 23.3.9 pr.; C. 4.6.2.sq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 259. 
34 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 73 sq. 
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recipient or to avoid a legal process35, or the transfer of a dowry in expectation 
of a marriage.36  
If the purpose envisaged failed to materialize - the slave was not freed or 
the marriage cancelled - the res was non secuta. In this case, the Roman jurists 
allowed recovery by means of the condictio.37 Paulus said: 
Paul. D. 12.5.1.1 Ob rem igitur honestam datum ita repeti 
potest, si res, propter quam datum est, secuta non est. 
What is given for a honourable purpose cannot be reclaimed 
unless the purpose envisaged fails to materialize.38 
The condictio indebiti and the condictio ob rem complemented each other. 
Performances that lay within recognised contracts could in principle be 
recovered with the condictio indebiti, and performances made by datio ob rem 
with the condictio ob rem, when the honourable purpose envisaged failed to 
materialize. Thus the giver, in a case outwith the range of consensual 
contracts, was protected by law, for even if he could not enforce counter-
performance he could at least claim his own performance back.39 
To be more precise, however, it must be stressed that the Romans did not 
create distinct types of condictiones. They recognised only one condictio with 
the abstract formula of the actio certae creditae pecuniae (or certae rei).40 The 
jurists identified different type cases which provided a ground for restitution 
by means of the condictio. Two of these cases were where a payment had been 
made that was not due (indebitum <12> solutum)41 and where a payment had 
been made for a purpose that was not achieved (datio ob rem non secutam). 
The texts only speak of condictio or repeti posse and name the facts of the 
case, like indebitum solutum or re non secuta. It was only Justinian who 
introduced different names for each type case in his Digest.42  
 
35 Ulp. D. 12.4.1 pr. 
36 Paul. D. 22.1.38.1; Ulp. D. 23.1.10; Paul., Iav. D. 12.4.9 pr. 
37 Kaser, RP I, p. 597; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 843 sq. 
38 All translations of the fragments of the Digest are based on 
Mommsen/Krueger/Watson, The Digest of Justinian (1985), but changed where appropriate. 
39 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 842, 857 sq. 
40 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 838 sq. See also above A I. <12> 
41 On the question of error see above note 29. 
42 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 838 sq.; see also below D I. 
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III. Condictio ob Rem and Condictio ob Turpem Causam 
1. The Datio ob Rem as the Element Common to Both the 
Condictio ob Rem and the Condictio ob Turpem Causam 
When reading the very first fragment of the Digest title that is concerned with 
the condictio ob turpem causam, it becomes clear that there is a connection 
with the condictio ob rem. The fragment runs: 
Paul. D. 12.5.1 Omne quod datur aut ob rem datur aut ob 
causam, et ob rem aut turpem aut honestam: turpem autem, 
aut ut dantis sit turpitudo, non accipientis, aut ut accipientis 
dumtaxat, non etiam dantis, aut utriusque. 1. Ob rem igitur 
honestam datum ita repeti potest, si res, propter quam datum 
est, secuta non est. 2. Quod si turpis causa accipientis fuerit, 
etiamsi res secuta sit, repeti potest. 
Everything given is given either ob rem or ob causam43, and 
in respect of things given ob rem some are evil and some 
honourable. Then, in the case of evil purposes, the giver may 
be in the wrong and not the recipient, or the recipient and not 
the giver, or both may be. 1. What is given for an honourable 
purpose cannot be reclaimed unless the purpose envisaged 
fails to materialize. 2. However, in the case of an evil 
purpose, where the recipient is in the wrong, there can be 
recovery even if the purpose envisaged does materialize. 
 
43 There has been considerable discussion about the meaning of causa and res in Roman 
law. That is because in some fragments the two terms seem to be used as synonyms (as in 
Paul. D. 12.5.1.2), whereas in others they seem to be used as different terms. This finding led 
some to suppose a postclassical interpolation. Fritz Schwarz (Condictio [1952], p. 170 and, in 
full detail, from pp. 117 sqq. onwards; see also v. Beseler, [1937] 3 SDHI 376) suggests that 
in classical times the Romans only used dare ob rem or turpis res; at this time, according to 
Schwarz, causa only denoted a motive for performance that was, however, legally of no 
importance. As a result, Schwarz assumes that all fragments using the term dare ob causam or 
turpis causa were altered by postclassical glossators. Rightly, objections are raised against this 
wide-ranging assumption of postclassical interpolation. As Kaser (RP I, p. 597 note 42) points 
out, the ground (causa) and purpose (res) of a performance are often so closely related that a 
universal conceptual distinction could only be imposed on the Roman jurists. Peter Bufe ("§ 
817 Satz 2 BGB" [1958/59] 157 AcP 215 [245 sq.]) rightly emphasizes that the fragment 
makes perfect sense as it stands so that nothing indicates an interpolation. Paul. D. 12.5.1.2 
represents pure classical Roman law. <13> 
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Paulus subdivided the category of the datio ob rem according to whether 
the purpose envisaged is tainted by turpitude or not. He then proceeded to 
explain the case of a datio ob rem inhonestam. On an abstract level, there are 
three possible cases where <13> turpitude is involved: in the first only the 
giver is tainted, in the second only the recipient, and in the third both of the 
parties. Having made these classifications, Paulus named two general rules. 
According to the first rule, recovery is possible when something was given for 
an honourable purpose (datio ob rem honestam), but the purpose failed to be 
achieved (res non secuta). We already know this rule from the foregoing 
section; it is the case of the condictio ob rem. The second rule concerns the 
datio ob rem inhonestam. It is set up as a contrast to the first rule, and 
expresses the fact that even although the purpose envisaged has been achieved, 
recovery is possible if the recipient acted with turpitude. The unifying element 
of the condictio ob rem and ob turpem causam is that both groups of case 
presuppose a datio ob rem, i.e. a performance made in order to achieve a 
purpose outwith contract.44  
2. The Condictio ob Turpem Causam as a Subcategory of the 
Condictio ob Rem? 
a) Founding on the text Paul. D. 12.5.1, it has been suggested45 that the 
condictio ob turpem causam was in fact not a condictio (a separate claim), but 
only a subcategory of the condictio ob rem. The assumption is that the 
condictio ob rem followed different rules if a case imported turpitude. So, 
whenever there was a case of a datio ob rem, the condictio ob rem was 
applied.46  
Normally, the success of the pursuer advancing the condictio ob rem 
depended on the failure of the purpose envisaged, as was the case if the 
recipient did not counter-perform. If the purpose had materialized, however, 
the condictio ob rem ceased.47 According to the view quoted above these rules 
of the condictio ob rem were modified when it came to immoral transactions. 
Then, recovery might be allowed even if the purpose had been achieved (res 
secuta). However, this exception was, so the reasoning goes, not needed in 
cases where the purpose was indeed immoral but did not materialize. Since 
here the res was non secuta, the normal rules of the condictio ob rem applied, 
 
44 On the datio ob rem see above A II 2, III. 
45 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 65 and pp. 80 sqq. 
46 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 80 sqq. 
47 Ulp. D. 12.4.1 pr. <14> 
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and recovery was allowed. Thus the condictio ob turpem causam is believed 
only to have a small field of application; often the condictio ob rem would be 
a sufficient remedy. Later, according to this view, Justinian separated the 
condictio ob <14> turpem causam from the condictio ob rem and created a 
distinct category for the former claim.48 
This view has consequences for the application of the in pari delicto rule, a 
rule that will be discussed in detail below.49 It bars recovery in cases where 
both of the parties are guilty of turpitude.50 According to the view mentioned 
the rule was not needed in cases where the normal rules of the condictio ob 
rem led to non-recoverability of the performance.51 In a case where the tainted 
purpose materialized (res secuta), the condictio ob rem did not operate to 
allow recovery. The in pari delicto rule is therefore thought to have been 
restricted to cases where a tainted purpose did not materialize (res non secuta); 
for in this case the condictio ob rem would normally enable the pursuer to 
recover what he gave. But since public policy demanded irrecoverability when 
the pursuer was himself guilty of turpitude, here the in pari delicto rule was 
established to bar recovery.52 
b) However, there are difficulties with this view. It imposes a rather 
complicated conception, with exceptions and subcategories, on the classical 
law of the condictio. The Roman jurists did indeed classify different groups of 
case, according to the facts involved. But the question they asked was whether 
the condictio as a procedural formula should be granted in a particular case 
rather than if it was a case where an exception to the condictio ob rem should 
be made. The view mentioned above creates the impression that the 
condictiones were different claims. However, this was not the case in classical 
times. There was only one condictio: this was the abstract procedural formula 
of the actio certae creditae pecuniae or certae rei. The jurists formed groups 
of cases in which recovery should be granted by means of this condictio. In 
this respect, it was a much simpler system than suggested by the view 
described above. Furthermore, this is what Paulus said in D. 12.5.1: "Omne 
quod datur aut ob rem datur aut ob causam, et ob rem aut turpem aut 
honestam." He divided the cases of datio ob rem according to whether the 
purpose was immoral or not; he used this device to delimit the different groups 
of case. He then applied separate rules to each of the different groups of case. 
 
48 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 80 sq. 
49 See below section B. 
50 For instance, Paul. D. 12.5.3. 
51 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 85 sqq. 
52 Honsell, loc. cit. <15> 
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The phrase "Quod si turpis causa accipientis fuerit, etiamsi <15> res secuta 
sit, repeti potest" at the end of the fragment D. 12.5.1 compares the cases of a 
datio ob rem inhonestam with those of a datio ob rem honestam. But the 
"etiamsi" only expresses the fact that in the former case of a datio ob rem 
inhonestam it did not matter whether the purpose had been achieved or not. 
The condictio should be granted ob turpem causam: because turpitude was 
involved.  
This leads to the further conclusion that the application of the in pari 
delicto rule was not a priori confined to cases where the purpose had not 
materialized, as the view described suggests. In principle, this rule operated 
where both parties were at fault, the res being secuta or non secuta. The exact 
field of application of the in pari delicto rule must be determined from the 
fragments which have come down to us.53 
The condictio ob rem and the condictio ob turpem causam were thus two 
distinct groups of case, both referring to a datio ob rem. The condictio ob 
turpem causam was not an exception or a subcategory of the condictio ob rem. 
The fact that a case imported turpitude was taken as the decisive issue to apply 
the condictio and to allow recovery.  
The following fragment found in the Digest title on the condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam speaks in favour of this understanding: 
Iul. D. 12.5.5 Si a servo meo pecuniam quis accepisset, ne 
furtum ab eo factum indicaret, sive indicasset sive non, 
repetitionem fore eius pecuniae Proculus respondit. 
If someone is given money by my slave to stop him 
revealing a theft committed by the slave, a reply of Proculus 
holds that the money will be recoverable whether or not he 
reveals the theft. 
The slave54 pays over money in order to encourage tainted behaviour on the 
part of the recipient not to denounce a crime, i.e. to encourage him to act as an 
 
53 See below section B. 
54 The case raises the issue of capacity of the slave. In general, a slave was not capable of 
acquiring property in his own right; all he acquired, he acquired for his master because the 
master had the dominica potestas, the power over the body and will of the slave (Sohm, 
Institutes [3rd ed., 1907], p. 166; Kaser, RP I, pp. 285 sq.). Being a natural person, however, a 
slave was capable of concluding juristic acts, once his master left property to be managed by 
the slave (a so called peculium; Sohm, Institutes [3rd ed., 1907], p. 165; Kaser, RP I, pp. 286 
and 287 sq.). Without a peculium or other authorization of his master a slave could not transfer 
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accessory after the fact. The decision of the case is unequivocal: recovery is 
possible whether the <16> purpose of the slave was achieved or not. In other 
words, it did not matter whether the res was secuta or not (sive indicasset sive 
non); since the purpose envisaged was tainted, the condictio was granted to 
enable the master to recover what he had lost.55 
In this context, the following text is also found: 
Ulp. D. 12.4.1 pr. Si ob rem non inhonestam data sit 
pecunia, ut filius emanciparetur vel servus manumitteretur 
vel a lite discedatur, causa secuta repetitio cessat. 
When money is given for a purpose which is not improper, 
as for the emancipation of a son, the manumission of a slave 
or the abandonment of a suit, recovery ceases once the 
purpose envisaged has materialized.  
In the case of a res non inhonestam the question arises whether the res is 
secuta or not. If the purpose has materialized recovery ceases. In the case of a 
res inhonesta there may be recovery regardless of whether the purpose has 
materialized at all (as in Iul. D. 12.5.5 above). The two fragments show that 
only if no turpitude was involved (ob rem non inhonestam) did it matter for 
the application of the condictio whether the purpose was achieved. So the first 
question was whether the res was honestam or inhonestam, and only if the 
answer to this was that the res was honestam did the second question of the 
res being secuta or not arise. This corresponds with the presentation of the 
matter in Paul. D. 12.5.1 above. 
The reason why recovery may be allowed on the grounds of a res 
inhonesta is that, where the transferee received the benefit on the grounds of 
his turpitudinous conduct, the benefit really belongs into the patrimony of the 
pursuer. A text from Ulpian provides examples: 
 
the property of his master. In the above case, the slave had no authorization to give away the 
money for his own purpose. Normally, the result would be that the master was still the owner 
and the rei vindicatio lay against the recipient. However, in the special case of transfer of 
money the recipient acquires ownership by commixtio. Therefore, in this case, the master had 
to rely on the condictio. Note that the text speaks of the purpose being achieved or not (sive 
indicasset sive non). This issue (which refers to res secuta/non secuta) is only important for 
the question whether the condictio lay or not. The rei vindicatio lay as soon as the pursuer 
could prove his ownership. <16> 
55 Cf. also J. G. Wolf, Causa Stipulationis (1970), p. 38 note 14. <17> 
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Ulp. D. 12.5.2 Ut puta dedi tibi ne sacrilegium facias, ne 
furtum, ne hominem occidas. In qua specie Iulianus scribit, 
si tibi dedero, ne hominem occidas, condici posse. 1. Item si 
tibi dedero, ut rem mihi reddas depositam apud te vel ut 
instrumentum mihi redderes. 
By way of example, take the case in which I pay you not to 
commit sacrilege, not to steal, or not to kill a man. In Julian's 
writings, it is held that in this kind of case, where I give to 
stop you killing someone, a condictio does lie. 1. Similarly, 
in the case where I pay to make you give me back something 
deposited with you, a document, for instance. <17> 
These cases have in common the fact that the recipient is actually obliged 
to desist from, or to undertake a, certain action, like not killing somebody or 
returning a deposited thing. Nevertheless, he accepts money for something he 
ought to do anyway. The policy behind the rule that allows recovery is 
obvious. Everyone must obey his duties without demanding extra to do so. If 
the recipient demands extra he has no right of retention of the benefit. This 
applies regardless of whether the recipient has done what he was supposed to 
do or not, i.e. regardless of whether the res is secuta or not. The decisive point 
for granting recovery is the turpitude involved. 
IV. The Condictio ob Turpem Causam and the Law of Contracts 
A question arises whether the condictio ob turpem causam was also granted 
when the immoral act consisted in the performance of a contract. In Roman 
law, if a performance was made to discharge an obligation falling within the 
fixed number of contractual obligations the condictio indebiti operated to 
recover the benefits transferred.56 The condictio ob turpem causam, by 
contrast, presupposed a situation in which a datio ob rem was given. A datio 
ob rem was a transfer which fell outwith the recognised types of contract. 
Therefore, in principle, the cases where the condictio indebiti was granted 
should easily be distinguished from those where the condictio would be given 
ob turpem causam.  
However, there are some fragments which speak of turpitude in the context 
of performance of contracts. These fragments will therefore be looked at more 
closely. On an abstract level, there are two possibilities concerning how an 
 
56 See in detail above A II 2. <18> 
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agreement can be affected by turpitude: the agreement as such can be immoral 
because it is dealing with an immoral objective, or, although the agreement 
itself is not objectionable, certain acts concerning its execution are. 
1. Immoral Agreement 
First, the agreement as a whole can be immoral. This is the case when the 
object of the agreement itself is tainted. Examples are an agreement for the 
payment of a bribe or to commit a murder. 
a) In classical Roman law, such an agreement could generally not create a 
contract. A contract existed when there was an action to enforce the promise, 
that is a formula <18> that fitted the circumstances of the case.57 A formula 
was not given in respect of an agreement for a tainted purpose (but see below 
b and c).58 Therefore, if something had been given in order to encourage 
immoral behaviour it was a datio ob rem inhonestam outwith contract. Thus, 
the condictio ob turpem causam operated to recover what was given. Since, as 
distinct from the position today, there was no contract, the transfer was not 
made solvendi causa; so it was not a case for the application of the condictio 
indebiti. The relationship of the condictio ob turpem causam with the 
condictio indebiti thus corresponds to the relationship of the condictio ob rem 
with the condictio indebiti, since both the condictio ob turpem causam and the 
condictio ob rem lay in cases of a datio ob rem, that is outwith contract. 
b) However, one exception must be mentioned in which a contract came to 
exist, notwithstanding the immorality of the purpose. This was the case of an 
abstract stipulation. In an abstract stipulation, the cause of the stipulation was 
not mentioned. A contract was nevertheless created because a valid abstract 
stipulation only presupposed the observation of a certain form.59 An abstract 
stipulation would, for instance, be created if A asks B to pay him 10.000, and 
B consents. By contrast, if the tainted cause was mentioned in the stipulatio, 
i.e. the stipulation was not abstract, the contract was void. Pomponius gives 
the example of the promise to kill someone or to commit a sacrilege60 (for 
instance, A asks B to pay him 10.000 for killing C).  
If the promise was made in the form of a stipulation, and the tainted cause 
was not mentioned (abstract stipulation), a contract was created because the 
 
57 See above A II 1. 
58 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 77. 
59 See above A II 1 c. 
60 Pomp. D. 45.1.27 pr. (cf. also Ulp. eod. 26). See also Pap. eod. 123: Si flagitii faciendi 
vel facti causa concepta sit stipulatio, ab initio non valet. – If a stipulation is made for the 
commission of a shameful act or in respect of one already committed, it is void from the start. 
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parties used the requisite form of question and answer. If the cause was 
immoral, however, the praetor prevented enforceability by denying a legal 
action or by giving a defence, the exceptio doli61: 
Paul. D. 12.5.8 Si ob turpem causam promiseris Titio, 
quamvis, si petat, exceptione doli mali vel in factum 
summovere eum possis, tamen si solveris, non posse te 
repetere, quoniam sublata proxima causa stipulationis, quae 
propter exceptionem inanis esset, pristina causa, id est 
turpitudo, superesset: porro autem si et dantis et <19> 
accipientis turpis causa sit, possessorem potiorem esse et 
ideo repetitionem cessare, tametsi ex stipulatione solutum 
est. 
If the basis of your promise to Titius is evil you can defeat 
his action by the defence of fraud or one adjusted to the 
circumstances. Yet, despite that, if you pay, you cannot 
recover. The reason is that although the immediate basis, the 
stipulation, is out of the way, being rendered empty by the 
availability of the defence, the antecedent causa still 
operates, namely the evil itself. Furthermore, if both parties, 
giver and recipient, are tainted, the possessor is the stronger, 
and no recovery is therefore possible even although the 
payment is made under a stipulation. 
Paulus stated that, on the one hand, Titius cannot enforce the promise. If tu, on 
the other hand, has performed, he cannot recover what he transferred to Titius 
on the basis of the promise. According to Roman civil law, the stipulation was 
valid. However, its cause being evil, the praetor used a procedural device to 
prevent the operation of the stipulation.62 In Paulus' view, this rendered the 
stipulation useless in the sense that Titius cannot enforce it. Tu is, according to 
praetorian law, therefore not obliged to pay. However, if tu paid on the 
stipulation, he cannot recover. This is at first sight surprising, for seemingly he 
paid to discharge an obligation (solvendi causa). Therefore one would expect 
the condictio indebiti to operate. The crucial point, however, is seen to be the 
immoral cause that still exists behind the useless stipulation. Recovery is thus 
discussed because of the turpitude involved: ob turpem causam. Yet since both 
 
61 Kaser, RP I, p. 251. <19> 
62 On his imperium as regards the modification of the ius civile see above note 13. <20> 
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parties were tainted recovery is denied through the operation of the in pari 
delicto rule. The reasoning might have been this: the abstract stipulation is, in 
civil law, valid and as such provides a legal basis for retention of what was 
received. Therefore, strictly speaking, the payment was due; there was, in this 
sense, a debitum. The condictio could not apply on the grounds that tu paid on 
an indebitum (condictio indebiti). On the other hand, the stipulation was 
rendered ineffectual by praetorian law because its cause imported turpitude. 
Therefore, the result was that the abstract stipulation was treated on a similar 
basis as the stipulation naming the evil cause, which was void in civil law. One 
could perhaps say that the abstract nature of the stipulation was broken by 
praetorian law. The result was that the underlying evil cause determined the 
procedural validity of the stipulation as well as the question of recovery. 
Indeed, there seems to be no justification for treating both cases differently 
merely because the parties did not mention the evil purpose envisaged under 
the terms of their agreement. <20> 
Although, apparently, the condictio ob turpem causam was applied to a 
contract here, it is an exception that is explicable because of the nature of the 
abstract stipulatio. The general conclusion is that the condictio ob turpem 
causam lay in cases of a datio ob rem inhonestam outwith contract, and that 
the condictio indebiti operated to recover payment of an indebitum. 
c) Cases are also recorded in which the terms of an agreement were neutral 
but the remote purpose was evil. An example would be the purchase of a knife 
in order to kill someone. The sale was valid; the remote motive of the 
purchaser did not affect its validity.63 Only if the purchased object could not 
be used other than in a tainted way, as was the case where poisonous medicine 
was sold, was the contract assumed to be invalid.64 However, there is no text 
that answers the question whether the condictio lay to recover the price paid in 
the latter case, and, if so, for what reason: whether ob turpem causam or 
because it was an indebitum. 
2. Tainted Acts in the Context of the Execution of a Contract 
The turpitude may be restricted to certain acts concerning the execution of an 
otherwise untainted contract. Paulus wrote: 
D. 12.5.9 Si vestimenta utenda tibi commodavero, deinde 
pretium, ut reciperem, dedissem, condictione me recte 
 
63 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 78. 
64 Gai. D. 18.1.35.2. <21> 
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acturum responsum est. quamvis enim propter rem datum sit 
et causa secuta sit, tamen turpiter datum est. 1. Si rem 
locatam tibi vel venditam a te vel mandatam ut redderes, 
pecuniam acceperis, habebo tecum ex locato vel vendito vel 
mandati actionem: quod si, ut id, quod ex testamento vel ex 
stipulatu debebas, redderes mihi, pecuniam tibi dederim, 
condictio dumtaxat pecuniae datae eo nomine erit. Idque et 
Pomponius scribit.  
If I lend you clothes for use and then pay you a price to get 
them back, the reply has been given that I will be right to sue 
by condictio. Though the giving was for a purpose and the 
purpose has materialized, it was nevertheless wrongful. 1. If 
you are given money to release things hired to you, sold by 
you, or entrusted to you under a mandate, I shall have 
against you the actions of hire, sale, or mandate, but if I give 
you money to get from you something owed by you under a 
will or stipulation, only the condictio will lie to recover that 
payment. So Pomponius also writes. 
Paulus considered different cases in which a contract, or in one case the will of 
a deceased, imposes an obligation on the recipient to return or hand over 
something to <21> the giver. Nevertheless the giver has to pay extra money to 
make the recipient return what he was bound to restore. Paulus decided that in 
some cases the condictio lies to recover the money, whereas in others there is 
an action on the contract. What at first sight looks like a confusing decision 
can again be explained by reference to the Roman procedure and their 
contractual system.65  
As has been noted, there was a limited number of fixed contractual types 
in classical Roman law. Generally speaking, a contract existed when there was 
an action to enforce a promise. This depended on the existence of a formula 
that fitted the circumstances of the case. The formula also determined the 
content of the actionable claim. The words laid down in a formula determined 
what could be claimed within a contractual relationship. For these reasons, we 
have to look at the formulae of loan, hire, sale, mandate, stipulation and 
testament.  
The formulae of mandate, sale and hire resemble each other as they all 
belonged to the so-called bonae fidei iudicia. As such they all appeared under 
 
65 See above A I 1 and A II 1. 
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the same rubric of the edictum perpetuum.66 One example is the actio 
mandati67: 
Quod As As No No mandavit, ut ..., 
quidquid ob eam rem Nm Nm Ao Ao dare facere oportet ex 
fide bona, 
eius, iudex, Nm Nm Ao Ao condemnato. 
Si non paret absolvito. 
 
In case the pursuer Aulus Agerius has ordered the defender 
Numerius Negidius to do ..., 
whatever the defender owes to the pursuer due to this with 
respect to good faith 
you, judge, shall condemn him to do. 
If it does not prove true you shall free him. 
The formula of the bonae fidei iudicia only differ with respect to the 
demonstratio, depending on the particular facts that are involved. The intentio 
of the formulae always runs the same: quidquid ob eam rem dare facere 
oportet ex fide bona. This provides a much wider latitude to the judge in 
making his decision than in the formula of the condictio.68 The condictio only 
allowed the judge to decide whether the certum (for instance ten thousand 
sestertii) was due or not. No other issue was relevant. It was the <22> 
prototype of an actio stricti iuris in classical Roman law.69 The formula of a 
bonae fidei iudicium, however, left open the issue of what exactly was due; the 
judge had to find out during the process.70 His guideline was expressed by the 
term ex fide bona. This referred to equity and fairness within the relationship 
of the parties.71 Thus he had to consider all the circumstances arising in the 
case consistent with good faith. In the Institutes of Justinian the bonae fidei 
iudicium is described as such: 
 
66 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. XIX, tit. XIX de bonae fidei iudiciis. 
67 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 295 sq. 
68 Kaser, RP I, p. 485; cf. also Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 368. <22> 
69 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 836. But see also note 5 above. 
70 Kaser, RP I, p. 485. 
71 Heumann/Seckel, Handlexikon (1891), p. 205 "fides" no. 5 a. 
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I. 4.6.30 in bonae fidei iudiciis libera potestas permitti 
videtur iudici ex bono et aequo aestimandi, quantum actori 
restitui debeat.  
In a bonae fidei iudicium we hold the judge to be allowed to 
estimate under equity how much is to be restored to the 
pursuer. 
The intentio of the formulae of loan72, stipulation73 and testamentum74, 
however, runs quidquid ob eam rem dare facere oportet (i.e. whatever the 
defender owes to the pursuer due to the res). In these formulae the term ex fide 
bona is missing. The claim quidquid ob eam rem dare facere oportet was not 
restricted to a certum but also concerned the recovery of an incertum. This 
means that the object of the claim was not strictly determined but open to the 
judge's decision. However, as regards a strict obligation like stipulation or 
legacy per damnationem75, the judge was only allowed to determine the 
incertum within the content of the obligation (ob eam rem)76, for instance, 
where the pursuer claimed an estate which had been bequeathed to him by 
testament.77 The iudex could adjudge everything which belonged to the estate 
(such as things and livestock) which were due under the terms of the legacy. 
However, he could not consider other circumstances outwith the obligation 
which arose from the testament; other circumstances apart from the content of 
the obligation could only be considered within a bonae fidei iudicium. So, if 
the possessor claimed additional money to hand over the estate he was not 
obliged to repay the money because of the testament since the content of the 
testament did not refer to this money. Therefore, the iudex <23> could not 
adjudge the money on the basis of the formula of the actio ex testamento. So 
the pursuer had to rely on the condictio to recover the extra money that had 
been paid. 
Paulus said that the condictio also lay in the case of loan. Therefore it 
seems that the formula of the actio commodati did not have an ex-fide-bona-
clause. According to the reasoning above, the recovery of the additional 
 
72 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 252. 
73 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 151 sqq. 
74 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 367. 
75 A legacy per damnationem created the obligation of the heir to transfer the bequeathed 
goods to the legatee; the heir was liable under the actio ex testamento. Under a legacy per 
vindicationem the legatee became the owner directly and could claim the goods from the heir 
with the rei vindicatio. Kaser, RP I, p. 743. 
76 Kaser, RP I, pp. 493 sq. 
77 Cf. Kaser, RP I, pp. 749 sq. <23> 
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money could not be considered within the actio commodati; therefore the 
condictio was applied. However, the question whether the actio commodati 
had an ex-fide-bona-clause is controversial.78 There are other fragments which 
allow the conclusion that the actio commmodati did have the ex-fide-bona-
clause, although it has been doubted whether those fragments represent pure 
classical Roman law.79 However, this issue is not strictly relevant to the point 
in hand. 
As a result, we see that only the bonae fidei iudicia provided the 
possibility to the judge of considering other circumstances beyond the content 
of the obligation. Thus other acts which were connected with the fulfilment of 
the contract could be considered. So, if the recipient only returned something 
to the pursuer after his having paid extra money, the judge could consider this 
under the clause ex fide bona. The return of the extra money to the pursuer 
was due ex fide bona because the recipient had no right to the extra money. 
By contrast, the formulae of testament, stipulation, and, according to 
Paulus, also of loan, did not allow the possibility of considering extraneous 
facts arising from the execution of the obligation. They were restricted to the 
question what was due ob eam rem, i.e. what was due on the basis of the 
obligation. Therefore their formulae did not cover the demand of the pursuer 
to recover money paid over without any obligation to do so. Thus the praetor 
granted the condictio in such cases. Since the recipient was acting immorally 
in requesting and accepting extra money for fulfilling an obligation otherwise 
due by him, it was a case of turpis causa (cf., for instance, Ulp. D. 12.5.2.1). 
In all of these cases the payment of the extra money is a datio ob rem since 
there was no obligation on the giver to pay over the money. It is not the case 
of a payment <24> made to discharge an obligation, so the condictio was not 
granted on the grounds that the payment was an indebitum. Since the payment 
was made to recover a datio ob rem inhonestam the condictio was granted ob 
turpem causam. Therefore, the fragment from Paulus conforms with the 
delimitation between the cases where the condictio operated to recover an 
 
78 Against a bona-fide-clause E. Levy, "Zur Lehre von den sog. actiones arbitrariae" 
(1915) 36 SZ 1; M. Kaser, "Oportere und ius civile" (1966) 83 SZ 30, and RP I, p. 534, each 
with further references; differently Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 253; in 
detail Pastori, Il Commodato nel Diritto Romano (1954), pp. 53 sqq. 
79 Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 253 assumes that the actio 
commodati had a bona-fide-clause but says himself that the formula as it appears in Ulpian's 
commentarii does not provide argument for this presumption and two fragments that would 
support this view were postclassical Justinian interpolations. <24> 
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indebitum and those where the condictio was given on the grounds of the 
turpitude involved.80 <25> 
B. THE BAR TO RECOVERY IN THE CASE OF MUTUAL TURPITUDE 
I. Origin and Field of Application of the Bar to Recovery 
After considering the case of the recipient alone being in turpitude which 
triggers liability to return the money, Paulus introduced the rule which applies 
to the case where both the giver and the recipient are in turpitude: 
Paul. D. 12.5.3 Ubi autem et dantis et accipientis turpitudo 
versatur, non posse repeti dicimus: veluti si pecunia detur, ut 
male iudicetur. 
When the evil taints both giver and recipient, we hold 
recovery to be excluded, as where money is paid to pervert a 
judgment. 
In D. 12.5.8, the rule is repeated with the additional reasoning that the 
possessor is better off:81 
Paul. D. 12.5.8 ... Porro autem si et dantis et accipientis 
turpis causa sit, possessorem potiorem esse et ideo 
repetitionem cessare ... 
If both parties, giver and recipient, are tainted, the possessor 
is better off, and no recovery is therefore possible. 
Papinian spoke of the two parties being in pari delicto:  
Pap. D. 12.7.5 pr. ... cum ob turpem causam dantis et 
accipientis pecunia numeretur, cessare condictionem et in 
delicto pari potiorem esse possessorem ... 
 
80 Cf. also Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 83 sq. <25> 
81 See also Ulp. D. 3.6.5.1 Sed etiam praeter hanc actionem condictio competit, si sola 
turpitudo accipientis versetur: nam si et dantis, melior causa erit possidentis. – But in 
addition to this action the condictio is also available if the turpitude is on the part of the 
recipient only. But if it is on the part of the giver as well, the position of the one in possession 
will be the stronger. <26> 
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When money is paid over on a basis the evil character of 
which taints both giver and recipient, the condictio will not 
lie, and where parties are equally in the wrong the possessor 
is better off. 
Broadly speaking, this rule bars recovery in cases where both parties are 
involved in a turpitudinous transaction.  
1. The Field of Application of the Rule in the Context of the 
Condictio ob Turpem Causam 
The fragment following the rule expressed in Paul. D. 12.5.3 gives 
examples of cases where the rule bars recovery: <26> 
Ulp. D. 12.5.4 idem, si ob stuprum datum sit, vel si quis in 
adulterio deprehensus redemerit se; cessat enim repetitio, 
idque Sabinus et Pegasus responderunt. 1. Item si dederit 
fur, ne proderetur, quoniam utriusque turpitudo versatur, 
cessat repetitio. 2. Quoties autem solius accipientis turpitudo 
versatur, Celsus ait, repeti posse; veluti si tibi dedero, ne 
mihi iniuriam facias. 3. Sed quod meretrici datur, repeti non 
potest, ut Labeo et Marcellus scribunt; sed nova ratione non 
ea, quod utriusque turpitudo versatur, sed solius dantis; 
illam enim turpiter facere, quod sit meretrix, non turpiter 
accipere, cum sit meretrix.  
The same applies where something is given for stuprum or 
where one caught in adultery buys his way out; there is no 
recovery in such a case, so held in replies of Sabinus and 
Pegasus. 1. Again, if a thief pays over to avoid being given 
away, there is no recovery, for both parties are tainted. 2. 
Celsus says that wherever the turpitude is only on the side of 
the recipient recovery is possible, as, for instance, where I 
pay to prevent your committing iniuria against me. 3. What 
is given to a prostitute cannot be recovered; so Labeo and 
Marcellus write. But according to a new view both parties 
are not tainted but the payer alone is; for the prostitute does 
wrong to be one but, being one, does no wrong in taking 
money.  
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In the principium, Ulpian denied recovery to someone who has paid money in 
order to commit a stuprum (indecency; for instance to have intercourse with an 
unmarried woman outwith a concubinatus, or a boy)82, and to someone who 
has paid money to silence the recipient who had caught him red-handed 
committing adultery. The lex Iulia de adulteriis criminalized both stuprum and 
adulterium.83 Therefore, committing a stuprum or adulterium was both 
contrary to good morals and the law. However, there is no indication that the 
lex Iulia de adulteriis also forbade the handing over of money in order to 
commit or disguise the criminal act; so we cannot conclude that the payment 
itself was regarded as being illegal. The Roman jurists did not explore this 
question. They put weight on the turpitude of the transaction based upon the 
parties' envisaging a crime. Ulpian regarded both parties as being at fault and, 
therefore, barred the claim. The same applies to a thief who pays the recipient 
not to be denounced; Ulpian said that both the giver and the recipient are 
tainted, and there is no recovery. By contrast, the giver is not to blame if he 
pays the recipient to make him abstain from a wrong against the giver. In this 
case, the giver wants to avoid a wrong, not to encourage one. Also, the 
recipient is obliged not to commit the wrong in the first place; if he asks for 
<27> money to abstain from the wrong it amounts to an extortion against the 
giver. The giver only protects himself and therefore acts unobjectionably.  
Ulpian then proceeded with the example of someone claiming back money 
he gave to a prostitute. This money cannot be recovered. According to an old 
view, both parties acted immorally, therefore the in pari turpitudine rule 
barred the claim. However, Ulpian reasoned differently and in a subtle way: 
only the payer is tainted, not the prostitute, for being a prostitute is immoral, 
but, once being one, it is not objectionable to take the money. This is, 
according to Ulpian, a case where recovery is denied because the giver alone 
acts in turpitude.84 
To illustrate a case where both parties are tainted, Paulus gave the example 
of bribery: 
Paul. D. 12.5.3 Ubi autem et dantis et accipientis turpitudo 
versatur, non posse repeti dicimus: veluti si pecunia detur, ut 
male iudicetur. 
 
82 Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (1899), pp. 694, 703. 
83 Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (1899), pp. 691 sqq.; M. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit 
und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassischen römischen Recht" (1940) 60 SZ 95 (p. 118). <27> 
84 Cf. Paul. D. 12.5.1. <28> 
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When the evil taints both giver and recipient, we hold 
recovery to be excluded, as where money is paid to pervert a 
judgment. 
Yet another example is given in: 
Ulp. D. 3.6.5 in heredem autem competit in id, quod ad eum 
pervenit. Nam est constitutum, turpia lucra heredibus 
quoque extorqueri, licet crimina extinguantur; utputa ob 
falsum, vel iudici ob gratiosam sententiam datum et heredi 
extorquebitur, et si quid aliud scelere quaesitum. 1. Sed 
etiam praeter hanc actionem condictio competit, si sola 
turpitudo accipientis versetur; nam si et dantis, melior causa 
erit possidentis. (…) 
But an action is available against the heir for what has come 
to him. For it has been laid down that dishonest gains are to 
be taken from heirs also, even though charges lapse. For 
example, a reward given for committing fraud or to a judge 
for a favourable verdict and anything else gained by criminal 
means will be taken from the heir as well. 1. But in addition 
to this action the condictio is also available if the only 
disgraceful behaviour is on the part of the recipient. But if it 
is on the part of the giver as well, the position of the one in 
possession will be the stronger. 
If someone has made gains in a tainted way and then dies his heir will be 
liable to return the gains due to the application of a praetorian actio in id quod 
ad eum <28> pervenit.85 The text refers to calumnia (D. 3.6), i.e. chicanery. In 
the context given here, there are two possible cases.86 First, the deceased had 
extorted money from the giver not to take up an unfair trial against the giver 
himself. Second, the deceased had accepted money from the giver for taking 
 
85 The actio in id quod ad eum pervenit given here in context with calumnia (chicanery) 
was an actio in factum (Ulp. D. 3.6.1 pr.; Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz [1915], pp. 
88 sqq.; G. H. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen [1932], pp. 55 sqq.). The praetor 
granted actiones in factum in cases where, according to the ius civile, there was no claim but 
equity demanded one. They were granted on the facts of the single case (in factum); Kaser, RP 
I, pp. 580 sqq. See also note 91 below. 
86 G. H. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen (1932), pp. 55 sq.; H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 
S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (pp. 384 
sq.). 
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up an unfair trial against a third party. Ulpian said that praeter actionem (in 
addition to this action87) the condictio lies. The condictio operates if only the 
recipient, that is the deceased, behaved in an objectionable way, whereas 
recovery is barred where the giver is also tainted. Thinking of the two cases of 
calumnia in Ulp. D. 3.6.5, we see that, in the first case, only the deceased is to 
blame since the giver protected himself against an unfair trial; here the 
condictio lies, as it always lies where the recipient demands extra without any 
right to do so (cf., for instance, Ulp. D. 12.5.4.2). In the second case where the 
giver made the deceased prosecute a third party both the giver and the 
recipient are tainted; in this case, therefore, recovery is barred.  
The case illustrates that the condictio ob turpem causam also lay against 
the heir of someone who acted immorally, although the heir himself is 
untainted. In Roman law, the heir was in principle liable for the obligations of 
the deceased.88 There were some exceptions made, especially as regards penal 
actions since the aim of these actions was the punishment and atonement of 
the guilty, not his innocent heir.89 The condictio, however, was not a penal 
action even if it was granted because the deceased had committed a crime 
(which is a case of ob turpem causam). Its only aim was to enforce the 
restoration of gains to which the deceased was not entitled, and to which the 
heir was also therefore not entitled.90 <29> 
As a result, we conclude that the examples given in the Digest of the 
application of the in pari delicto rule concern transfers that were made in the 
context of severe moral offences and crimes. The texts mention acts like 
indecency, fraud, chicanery and bribery. In the case of criminal acts forbidden 
by law, the jurists focused upon the turpitude of the parties as a justification 
for applying the rule although the criminal acts which the parties envisaged 
infringed both good morals and legislation.91 As has been observed in the 
 
87 Levy assumes with good reason that the action Ulpian means in D. 3.6.5.1 (praeter 
actionem) is not the actio in id quod ad eum pervenit mentioned in the principium but the 
actio vulgaris de calumniatoribus which is the object of the title D. 3.6 (Privatstrafe und 
Schadensersatz [1915], pp. 102 sq.). Likewise H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische 
Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (p. 384). 
88 Kaser, RP I, p. 733. 
89 Kaser, RP I, p. 612. See also Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz (1915), pp. 89 sqq. 
90 In cases where the condictio did not lie the praetor created actiones in id quod ad eum 
pervenit or quanto locupletior factus est because in law that the heir was not liable to penal 
actions: with these praetorian actions the pursuer could at least claim from the heir the gains 
which the deceased had made from the crime. Cf. Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz 
(1915), pp. 89 sqq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 600. <29> 
91 The view once put forward by M. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im 
klassischen römischen Recht" (1940) 60 SZ 95 (p. 141), that legal solutions referring to 
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context of the condictio ob turpem causam, the decisive criterion was the 
turpitude involved. 
2. The Policy of the Rule – An Excursion into the Law of 
Possession 
It is striking that a rule with a similar wording and result to the in pari delicto 
rule can be found in other fragments of the Digest which, however, do not 
concern the condictio ob turpem causam, but are reported in the context of the 
law of possession. This could help us to understand the origin and the often 
questioned policy of the rule regarding the condictio ob turpem causam. In the 
context of the law of possession, it becomes clear what is meant by two parties 
being in pari causa.  
Paulus said: 
Paul. D. 50.17.128 pr. In pari causa possessor potior haberi 
debet. 
Where two parties are in the same condition, the possessor 
must be regarded as being better off.  
According to the palingenesia of this fragment92, Paulus reported the rule in 
the context of the actio Publiciana. This was a praetorian action by which a 
former possessor (the pursuer) who had begun the period of positive 
prescription (usucapio), but had then lost his possession, could claim the thing 
from the current possessor. The reason is that if the pursuer had not lost his 
possession he would have become the owner: the usucapio led to the transfer 
of ownership provided that a certain term of possession (one or two years) had 
elapsed and that other requirements (like possession ex iusta causa and good 
faith) were met. Therefore the praetor protected the pursuer as <30> if he had 
already become the owner; the actio Publiciana resembled the rei vindicatio.93 
The actio Publiciana – in accordance with the rules of usucapio – required 
 
turpitudo seem to be postclassical, whereas classical jurists would rather have reasoned with 
the legal prohibition in question is not reflected in the fragments examined here. Kaser himself 
admitted later that this view could only be sustained by the assumption of wide-ranging 
interpolations of the classical texts, which no longer conforms with modern text-critique; 
Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 69 sq. 
92 Lenel, Palingenesia, vol. I, 999; D. Daube, "Zur Palingenesie einiger 
Klassikerfragmente" (1959) 76 SZ 149 (p. 200). <30> 
93 Kaser, RP I, p. 439. 
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that (i) the pursuer had come into possession by way of a traditio ex iusta 
causa; and, in principle, that (ii) he believed that he had become the owner due 
to the traditio ex iusta causa. As such, the traditio is the mere transfer of 
possession. However, it effected the transfer of ownership of a res nec 
mancipi94 if it was carried out with the intention to transfer ownership and ex 
iusta causa, i.e. in fulfilment of an agreement that ownership should pass (as, 
for instance, sale or gift).95 
There are two main groups of case where the actio Publiciana applied. 
The first group comprised cases where the pursuer had the thing in bonis96, 
meaning that the owner who intended to transfer ownership failed to do so 
only because he did not use the appropriate formal act. An example would be 
the transfer of a res mancipi, i.e. things which require the form of a 
mancipatio to allow ownership to pass, such as land or slaves. If the owner of 
an estate did not use the mancipatio but merely a traditio ex iusta causa to 
transfer ownership the transferee would not become the owner according to 
the ius Quiritium, the strict civil law. The transferee could therefore not rely 
on the rei vindicatio should he have lost possession. However, since the 
transfer of ownership failed because of mere formal requirements the praetor 
regarded him as the owner and granted the actio Publiciana to enable him to 
get the estate back. The second group concerned cases where the transferor 
was not the owner and therefore could not transfer ownership. However, if the 
pursuer was in good faith as to the ownership of the transferor the praetor 
protected his possession, to a degree, by means of the actio Publiciana.97 
The fragment of Paul. D. 50.17.128 pr. has been deprived of its illustrative 
case. However, there is a text from Ulpian which provides a decision from 
Julian in this context: <31> 
Ulp. D. 6.2.9.4 Si duobus quis separatim vendiderit bona 
fide ementibus, videamus, quis magis Publiciana uti possit, 
utrum is cui priori res tradita est an is qui tantum emit. Et 
Iulianus libro septimo digestorum scripsit, ut, si quidem ab 
eodem non domino emerint, potior sit cui priori res tradita 
 
94 Res nec mancipi are things which do not require the form of the mancipatio in order to 
effect a transfer of ownership. The mancipatio was necessary to transfer ownership of res 
mancipi, i.e. estates, slaves and livestock. See Kaser, RP I, pp. 123, 43 sqq. 
95 Kaser, RP I, pp. 416 sqq.; see also Kaser, Eigentum und Besitz im älteren römischen 
Recht (2nd ed., 1956), p. 197. 
96 Kaser, RP I, p. 403. 
97 On both groups of case see P. Apathy, "Die actio Publiciana beim Doppelkauf vom 
Nichteigentümer" (1982) 99 SZ 158; Kaser, RP I, p. 438. <31> 
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est, quod si a diversis non dominis, melior causa sit 
possidentis quam petentis. Quae sententia vera est. 
If someone has separately sold the same thing to two parties, 
each of whom bought in good faith, which of them has the 
better right to the actio Publiciana, the one to whom the 
thing was first delivered or the one who merely bought it? 
Julian, in the seventh book of his Digest, writes that if the 
two buy from the same non-owner, the one to whom the 
thing is first delivered is better off. But if they buy from 
different non-owners, the possessor is in a better position 
than the pursuer. This view is correct. 
The rule is not confined to cases of the actio Publiciana.98 The example is 
chosen here in order to explain the reasoning behind the conception of a par 
causa. The fragment comprises two different cases. In the first, the same thing 
has been sold by the same non-owner to two different bona fide buyers. In the 
second, the same thing has been sold by two different non-owners to two 
different bona fide buyers. One of the buyers is in possession and the other 
one raises the actio Publiciana against him in order to get hold of the thing. In 
this latter case Julian held that the possessor is better off. Therefore, the actio 
Publiciana is not successful, and the possessor may keep the thing. Paulus' 
fragment names the par causa as a reason for the possessor being better off. 
This raises the question whether Julian was also of the view that the parties 
were in pari causa here.  
Peter Apathy has shown that in the second case, apart from the fact that 
one of them is in possession, both buyers are in the same position as regards 
the actual right of possession and the ability successfully to raise the actio 
Publiciana.99 This becomes <32> clear when a comparison is made with the 
 
98 For instance, the rule is also found in the context of pledge: Paulus says in D. 20.4.14 
that if the same non-owner, at different times, has given the same thing as a pledge to two 
different creditors the first creditor is preferred, whereas if the pledge was given by two 
different non-owners possessor melior sit. See also Ulp. D. 50.17.154 Cum par delictum est 
duorum, semper oneratur petitor, et melior habetur possessoris causa (…) - When the delict 
of two is equal, the plaintiff is always worse off and the position of the possessor is regarded 
as stronger. The latter fragment stems from the law on interdicta by which the praetor 
protected the possessor against interference (Ulp. 70 ad ed. Uti possidetis, concerning the 
exceptio vitiosae possessionis); see D. Daube, "Zur Palingenesie einiger Klassikerfragmente" 
(1959) 76 SZ 149 (pp. 248 sqq.); Lenel, Palingenesia, vol. II, 822. 
99 P. Apathy, "Die actio Publiciana beim Doppelkauf vom Nichteigentümer" (1982) 99 
SZ 158 (pp. 182 sqq.). P. Apathy also thoroughly discusses the antinomy between Ulp. D. 
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first case. In the first case where the same non-owner sold the same thing 
twice the first buyer is preferred because his procedural rights are stronger 
than those of the second buyer. Why is this? The case is decided in parallel 
with the case where the non-owner of an estate sells it to the first buyer; then 
he becomes the owner of the estate because he inherits it and sells it again to 
another buyer.100 The first buyer bought from a non-owner; so, although he 
has the estate in bonis, he has not become the owner according to the ius 
Quiritium. If the heir and owner sells the estate again by using the mancipatio 
the second buyer becomes the owner according to the ius Quiritium. However, 
since the first buyer has the estate in bonis the praetor protects him against the 
real owner. If we assume that the original owner and heir (before the second 
sale) comes into possession again, the first buyer can successfully raise the 
actio Publiciana against him (see above). If the first buyer is in possession and 
the original owner raises the rei vindicatio against him on the grounds that he 
is still the owner according to the ius Quiritium the praetor gives the buyer the 
exceptio doli to bar the rei vindicatio since the owner had intended to transfer 
ownership to the first buyer. Therefore, after the first sale, the owner has 
merely got a nudum ius: his ownership is worthless in court and, after the first 
sale, it amounts only to a formal legal position. The crucial point is that if he 
now sells the estate again he can only transfer this nudum ius (according to the 
principle that nobody can transfer more rights than he has himself101). Hence, 
the first buyer is in a stronger position than the second buyer since the second 
buyer has only got the nudum ius. The first buyer can successfully raise the 
actio Publiciana against him viz. the second buyer will not be able to succeed 
with the rei vindicatio against the first buyer.  
The difference with our case is that the non-owner does not later become 
the owner, and, consequently, neither does the second buyer. However, Julian 
decided the case on similar grounds: even if the seller became the owner and 
could transfer ownership to the second buyer, the second buyer would gain 
less than the first buyer since, in court, the first buyer’s position is stronger 
and the second buyer only has a nudum ius. If the second buyer did not even 
 
6.2.9.4 and Nerat. D. 19.1.31.2 (pp. 160 sqq.). According to Neratius, the buyer to whom the 
thing was first delivered must always be preferred; so Neratius does not refer to the rule in 
pari causa possessor potior haberi debet. However, this classical controversy does not 
question the fact that Ulpian, Julian and Paulus applied the rule <32> because they thought the 
two buyers were in pari causa if they had bought from two different non-owners. Therefore, 
the fragment from Ulpian may still be used for our purpose to show what was understood by 
two parties being in pari causa. 
100 Pomp., Iul. D. 21.3.2; Ulp., Iul. D. 44.4.4.32. 
101 Ulp. D. 50.17.54 nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet. <33> 
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become the owner the position of the first buyer must, all the more, be the 
stronger. <33> 
In the second case, however, two different non-owners sell the same thing 
to two different buyers. In this situation, the case cannot clearly be decided in 
parallel with the case where the non-owner after the first sale becomes the 
owner and sells again. If there are two non-owners both could possibly 
become the owner – so we cannot decide which buyer is in the stronger 
position than the other. It is possible that the first non-owner becomes the 
owner; in which case the first buyer would be in the stronger position. If, 
however, the second non-owner becomes the owner the second buyer is in a 
stronger position than the first buyer. Therefore, the case could only be 
decided if one non-owner really became the owner; then his buyer must be in 
the better position. In our case, however, none of the two non-owners later 
becomes the owner. The parallel would only work if there were only one non-
owner who sold the same thing twice. If there are two non-owners and both 
could possibly become the real owner there is a legal stalemate between the 
two buyers.102 Therefore, both buyers must be regarded as being in the same 
position: they are in pari causa.  
Julian decides that, in this situation, the one who is in possession is better 
off. This can be explained by reference to the procedural situation. If we 
assume that the second buyer is in possession and the first buyer raises the 
actio Publiciana against him, the praetor or iudex would find that, apart from 
the possession of the defender, both parties are in pari causa. The pursuer 
cannot advance a better right to possess the thing than the defender. So there is 
no reason to take the thing away from the defender whose position is equally 
strong as that of the pursuer. The action of the first buyer is not successful 
 
102 Cf. also M. Kaser, "In bonis esse" (1961) 78 SZ 173 (pp. 188 sq.), who, however, 
deduces this result from the rules of usucapio: who first becomes owner by way of usucapio is 
uncertain as long as the term of usucapio has not elapsed; so, before this term has elapsed, 
Kaser reasons, both parties are legally in the same position. However, the loss of possession 
interrupts the usucapio (Kaser, RP I, p. 423). Therefore, in this respect, the pursuer should be 
in a worse condition: the defender is in possession, therefore his term of usucapio is still 
running, whereas the usucapio of the pursuer stopped. Furthermore, someone who regains 
possession but is not any more in good faith does not meet the requirements of usucapio and 
cannot become the owner (Paul. D. 41.3.15.2; P. Apathy, "Die actio Publiciana beim 
Doppelkauf vom Nichteigentümer" [1982] 99 SZ 158 [p. 185]). Of course, Kaser sees that the 
usucapio of the pursuer is interrupted, but he argues that also the defender might lose 
possession before his term elapses. Yet this fiction does not meet the facts of the case; the fact 
is that the defender is in possession, and therefore his usucapio is, at least at the moment, 
much better secured than that of the pursuer. Kaser's view cannot explain sufficiently why 
there should be a par causa between the parties. <34> 
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because his legal position is not stronger than that of the defender. 
Furthermore, if we assume that his action was successful the second buyer 
could in turn bring the actio Publiciana against the first buyer. The end result 
would be a never ending circle of claims. To avoid this absurdity the thing is 
left with the current <34> possessor. Regarding the right of possession, 
therefore, both parties are in pari causa. The melior causa of the possessor is 
the result of Julian's decision that the actual possessor may keep the thing. It 
therefore equals Paulus' possessor potior haberi debet but does not express 
that the parties are not in pari causa as regards the right of possession. 
Turning back to the condictio ob turpem causam, we find that the Roman 
jurists put forward the same reasoning in respect of the possessor being better 
off where the two parties are in the same condition. The same condition here 
arises where both parties are equally at fault (in pari delicto). It seems that the 
Roman jurists have transferred the conclusion drawn from the law of 
possession to the situation where both parties are at fault as regards a tainted 
transfer: if the pursuer cannot advance a better right to claim the goods back 
than the defender the claim is barred.103 Although the law applicable to the 
condictio is different from the law of possession in that it belongs to the law of 
obligations and not to the law of property the idea that the pursuer must 
present a stronger right in court than the defender in order to succeed is 
universal in application.104  
However, there is a difference between the rule as used in the law of 
possession and the condictio. The actio Publiciana is an actio in rem, i.e. the 
question is whether the pursuer has a right to the thing which is in the 
possession of the defender. The condictio, by contrast, is an actio in personam. 
The question here is whether the defender is liable as a person, i.e. whether the 
defender is, personally, under a duty towards the pursuer.105 The defender's 
liability under the condictio does not directly refer to his possession: once he 
 
103 H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (p. 385); Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 88 sqq.; 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 846. 
104 Cf. the general way in which the rule is expressed in Ulp. D. 50.17.154 Cum par 
delictum est duorum, semper oneratur petitor, et melior habetur possessoris causa (…) – 
When the delict of two is equal, the pursuer is always worse off and the position of the 
possessor is regarded as stronger. According to its palingenesia, the fragment stems from the 
law on interdicta by which the praetor protected the possessor against interference (Ulp. 70 ad 
ed. Uti possidetis, concerning the exceptio vitiosae possessionis); see D. Daube, "Zur 
Palingenesie einiger Klassikerfragmente" (1959) 76 SZ 149 (pp. 248 sqq.); Lenel, 
Palingenesia, vol. II, 822. 
105 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 6 sq. 
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has received the goods transferred the condictio is in principle successful even 
if the defender has meanwhile lost possession.106 Fritz <35> Schwarz107 
therefore doubts if the use of the term melior causa possidentis in the context 
of the condictio ob turpem causam is classical. However, the reference to 
possessio can be explained by an analogous transfer of the rule from the law of 
possession, meaning that the jurists used the same wording of the established 
rule but transferred the reasoning alone without intending a technical use of 
the term possessio in the new context. 
As regards the policy of the rule, it is often discussed whether the rule 
aims to punish the pursuer because of his turpitude.108 However, the reasoning 
of the Roman jurists does not refer to any idea of punishment of the parties; 
recovery is not barred in order to punish the pursuer but because he is in the 
same legal position regarding the goods transferred as the defender. The idea 
of punishment does not provide any solution since both parties are in the 
wrong; so it could not explain why one is to be punished whereas the other is 
allowed to keep the fruits of the wrong. Likewise, the idea that the parties 
come to court with unclean hands and therefore must not be heard is not 
supported by the fragments. According to this explanation, the rule aims to 
protect the dignity of the court in that it saves the court from investigating the 
immoral matters of the case.109 But the question of the immoral conduct arises 
at an earlier stage of the inquiry, that is, where the court investigates whether 
the condictio ob turpem causam lies at all. The rule cannot possibly protect the 
court at this stage of the enquiry. It is likewise questionable if the rule is 
originally explained by the idea that legal help should be denied because 
neither of the parties deserves to be legally protected. The Roman jurists rather 
saw the issue to lie in the legal stalemate of the parties and for this reason left 
the transfer with the defender. It is a procedural rule, aimed at the practical 
need to decide on the pursuer's claim that can only be successful if he presents 
a stronger right than the defender has. <36> 
 
106 Pomp. D. 12.6.7; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 897 sq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 
598; cf. also Schwarz, Condictio (1952), p. 188. <35> 
107 Condictio (1952), pp. 188 sq. 
108 Cf. J.K. Grodecki, "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis" (1955) 71 LQR 254 
(pp. 265 sqq.); Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), p. 58. On the origin of the policy of 
punishment see Chapter Two II 2. On the discussion of the policy of the rule in modern law 
see the Chapters Three (German Law) II 1, Four (Italian law) II 1, Five (English law) II 2, 
each with references. 
109 Cf. J.K. Grodecki, "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis" (1955) 71 LQR 254 
(pp. 265 sqq.); Rescigno, In Pari Causa Turpitudinis, p. 54. <36> 
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II. The In Pari Delicto Rule as a Strict Rule, or a Matter of Discretion? 
A question worth considering is whether the Roman jurists regarded the in 
pari delicto rule as a strict rule110 in the sense that the rule operated as soon as 
both parties were at fault, or whether they applied the rule flexibly by 
weighing out the turpitude of each party in the individual case. In the latter 
case, the in pari delicto rule might not have been applied when the transferor 
was less at fault than the recipient. Seiler111 assumes that the Roman jurists 
took an approach to the in pari delicto rule which was flexible in two respects: 
first, that they only applied the rule to cases of severe turpitude, and second, 
that they compared the degree of turpitude of the parties and did not bar 
recovery where the transferor was less to blame than the recipient.112  
Seiler draws the first conclusion from the fact that the examples in the 
Digest deal with severe acts like indecency, adultery, and bribery.113 The 
examination above of the fragments applying the rule in the context of the 
condictio ob turpem causam114 supports Seiler's finding in this respect. There 
is no example where the rule would bar recovery in cases of minor 
infringements of good morals. In this context it seems possible to assume that 
the jurists applied the rule with a certain flexibility since the question when 
conduct must be regarded as a minor infringement of good morals is at least to 
some degree open to discretion. Notwithstanding the fact that the Roman 
jurists often referred to the boni mores of their ancestors, moral codes are 
never entirely fixed but change according to the prevailing views of a certain 
time.115  
 
110 In modern literature, there is no agreement on the – different – question whether 
Roman regulae were non-binding descriptions of legal situations or if they were binding law. 
To this question Stein, Regulae juris (1966); Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (1965), pp. 26 
sqq. The nature of the in pari delicto rule must be taken from the remaining fragments since 
they are the only evidence; see H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: 
Festschrift für Wilhelm Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (p. 382). 
111 H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379; assenting Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 847. 
112 H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (pp. 382, 385 sqq., esp. 388). Similar J.K. Grodecki, "In pari 
delicto potior est conditio defendentis" (1955) 71 LQR 254 (p. 256), but without further 
consideration. 
113 Loc. cit., p. 385. 
114 B I 1. 
115 Cf. also M. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassischen römischen 
Recht" (1940) 60 SZ 95 (p. 139 sq.). <37> 
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However, apart from the fact that the texts in the Digest only deal with 
severe moral offences the fragments Seiler cites do not provide direct proof of 
a flexible approach to the rule. In particular, there are difficulties with Seiler’s 
view that the jurists compared the degree of turpitude of the parties and 
allowed recovery where the transferor was at <37> fault but less so than the 
recipient. We do not find reasoning in the fragments saying that the rule 
should not be applied because the pursuer is less at fault, or because the case is 
one of minor turpitude. One fragment Seiler cites116 is: 
Pap. D. 12.7.5 pr. Avunculo nuptura pecuniam in dotem 
dedit neque nupsit: an eandem repetere possit, quaesitum 
est. dixi, cum ob turpem causam dantis et accipientis 
pecunia numeretur, cessare condictionem et in delicto pari 
potiorem esse possessorem: quam rationem fortassis 
aliquem secutum respondere non habituram mulierem 
condictionem: sed recte defendi non turpem causam in 
proposito quam nullam fuisse, cum pecunia quae daretur in 
dotem converti nequiret: non enim stupri, sed matrimonii 
gratia datam esse. 
A woman gave a money dowry to her uncle whom she was 
going to marry, but she did not marry him. Can she recover 
it? I said that when money is paid over on a basis the evil 
character of which taints both giver and recipient, the 
condictio will not lie, and that where parties are equally in 
the wrong the possessor is the stronger. Following this 
reasoning one might hold that the woman could not have the 
condictio. But I further said that it was correct to object that 
in the case as given there was no basis at all and hence no 
evil basis, since the money which was given could not 
become a dowry, the point being that it was given not for 
improper sexual relations but for marriage.117  
If a niece and the brother of her mother married it was considered to be 
incestum and thus indecency (stuprum) that was forbidden by law.118 Since 
 
116 H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (pp. 385 sq.). 
117 To far-reaching and inconvincing assumptions of interpolations see v. Beseler (1937) 
3 SDHI 378; Schwarz, Condictio (1952), pp. 176 sqq. 
118 Gai., Inst. 1.62; Paul. D. 23.2.39.1; H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", 
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envisaging a stuprum resulted in the application of the in pari delicto rule119, 
Papinian considered applying the rule. However, he then stated that this is not 
a case of money given for an immoral cause. A dowry presupposes a 
marriage.120 Even although the dowry goods can be transferred before the 
marriage is actually concluded (dotis datio), if the marriage fails to take place 
the goods do not constitute a dowry, and the giver can reclaim these goods by 
means of the condictio.121 Here, uncle and niece eventually did not get 
married, so the money could not constitute a dowry and the niece can claim it 
back. It is a case of a res non secuta. Since the marriage did not take place 
there is no basis for the transferred goods to become a dowry. The turpitude 
does not lie in the marriage itself <38> but in the indecency, the stuprum. The 
money, so Papinian reasoned, was not given for the stuprum but for the 
marriage and thus for an – in itself – unobjectionable purpose. 
Seiler is of the opinion that Papinian weighed up the turpitude here and 
came to the conclusion that indecency in marriage is not as immoral as 
common indecency. Papinian would therefore have refused to apply the in 
pari delicto rule.122 However, Papinian expressed himself in a different way: 
he denied that there was any turpitude in this case (non turpem causam in 
proposito).123 The condictio he granted is not one ob turpem causam. Since the 
purpose for the transfer of the money, i.e. to constitute a dowry, is not 
fulfilled, the claim is a condictio ob rem, i.e. the condictio is granted because 
the purpose envisaged did not materialize. This is in accordance with the other 
cases of a dotis datio without marriage.124 Therefore, this fragment cannot be 
 
in: Festschrift für Wilhelm Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (p. 386). 
119 Ulp. D. 12.5.4 pr., above B I 1. 
120 Ulp. D. 23.3.3. 
121 Kaser, RP I, p. 336. <38> 
122 H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (pp. 387 and 388). 
123 Also Schwarz, Condictio (1952), p. 178. 
124 Ulp. D. 23.3.7.3, Call. D. 23.3.8., Paul. D. 22.1.38.1; Ulp. D. 23.1.10; Paul., Iav. D. 
12.4.9 pr. - Pap. D. 12.7.5 pr. speaks against the view of P. Bufe, "§ 817 Satz 2 BGB" 
(1958/59) 157 AcP 215 (pp. 240 sqq., esp. p. 247), who assumes that the in pari delicto rule 
was only applied to cases of a res secuta. Papinian would then not have considered the 
application of this rule to a case of obvious res non secuta without further discussion. Also, in 
no fragment of the title is it said that both performances have already been fulfilled, as Bufe 
himself admits (p. 247). Bufe assumes that this was not necessary because in Paul. D. 12.5.1.2 
it was generally expressed that the cases of the title only consisted of cases of a res secuta (pp. 
242 sqq., esp. p. 246). The text, however, implies that both cases of res secuta and res non 
secuta were meant. Honsell (Rückabwicklung [1974], pp. 85 sqq., 87 sq.), on the other hand, 
argues that the rule only applied to cases of a res non secuta. On these issues see above A III. 
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seen as an example in favour of the view that the Roman jurists applied the 
rule in a flexible manner. The condictio granted is not one ob turpem causam, 
and Papinian did not apply the rule because there is no turpitude involved. 
Another fragment is: 
Ulp. D. 12.5.2.2 Sed si dedi, ut secundum me in bona causa 
iudex pronuntiaret, est quidem relatum condictioni locum 
esse: sed hic quoque crimen contrahit (iudicem enim 
corrumpere videtur) et non ita pridem imperator noster 
constituit litem eum perdere. 
It has been held that a condictio lies where, when I have a 
winning cause of action, I pay to make the judge pronounce 
in my favour. However, then the payer commits an offence 
(for he corrupts the judge), and not so long ago our emperor 
held that he loses his case. 
A party bribes the judge even although his is a winning case. Ulpian referred 
to authority (relatum est) when deciding that the payer can recover the money 
he paid. However, we are then told that according to a recent constitution he 
loses his case <39> because the judge had been bribed, which was a crime. 
The decision seems odd since both giver and recipient act immorally in being 
involved in bribery, and so, according to the in pari delicto rule, recovery 
should be denied. The fragment must be seen in connection with: 
Paul. D. 12.5.3 Ubi autem et dantis et accipientis turpitudo 
versatur, non posse repeti dicimus: veluti si pecunia detur, ut 
male iudicetur. 
When the evil taints both giver and recipient, we hold 
recovery to be excluded, as where money is paid to pervert a 
judgment. 
In this case, the judge was bribed in a non-winning cause of action. Paulus 
applied the in pari delicto rule with the result that the payer cannot recover 
what he gave. Seiler assumes that because in the first case the judge did not 
taint the judgment it was a case of minor turpitude on the side of the giver125, 
who was on a winning cause of action in any case. He concludes that the 
 
<39> 
125 Loc.cit., p. 386. 
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jurists, in this case, regarded the parties as not being in pari delicto and thus 
did not apply the rule.126 However, there are difficulties in reconciling the two 
fragments in this way. It is doubtful whether the jurists really regarded the 
giver on a winning cause of action as less to blame. Ulpian spoke of a crime 
having been committed by judge and briber in the first case. The fault of the 
giver should be equal in both cases, since he did not know during the 
procedure, that is at the time of the bribery, that his case would be successful 
in any case. Otherwise there would have been no point in bribing the judge. 
The question whether the judge acts less objectionably in not tainting the 
judgment in the first case is not decisive as regards the claim of the giver: for 
the judge is only the recipient and not the pursuer. Active and passive bribery 
was a crime according to the lex Cornelia.127 So both the giver and the judge 
are involved in a crime and at fault. The two fragments from Ulpian and 
Paulus do contradict each other, and there is no obvious solution to this 
contradiction. But one thing may be said: the contradiction cannot plausibly be 
solved by assuming that the giver is less to blame where the iudex did not taint 
the judgment. <40> 
We conclude that there is no indication that the Roman jurists compared 
different degrees of fault of the parties. The cases in the Digest where both 
parties are at fault are generally cases where they envisage a crime or indecent 
acts. Since both parties aim to achieve this act, both should equally be at fault. 
Even if the giver induces the receiver to commit the crime and does not 
commit it himself he is not less to blame.128 <41> 
C. THE CONDICTIO OB INIUSTAM CAUSAM 
There is only one fragment in the title De condictione ob turpem vel 
iniustam causam of the Digest expressly concerning an iniusta causa. In D. 
 
126 Loc.cit. 
127 Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (1899), pp. 674 sq.; M. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit 
und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassischen römischen Recht" (1940) 60 SZ 95 (p. 113). See Marcian. 
D. 48.10.1.2 sq. Sed et si quis ob renuntiandum remittendumve testimonium dicendum vel non 
dicendum pecuniam acceperit, poena legis Corneliae adficitur. Et qui iudicem corruperit 
corrumpendumve curaverit. 3. Sed et si iudex constitutiones principum neglexerit, punitur. – 
Also if anyone takes money for renouncing or withdrawing evidence or for giving or 
withholding [evidence], he is subject to the penalty of the lex Cornelia. So also is [the person] 
who corrupts, or provides for the corruption of a judge. 3. Also if a judge neglects the imperial 
constitutions, he is punished. See also Paul., Sent. 5.25.2. <40> 
128 In Roman law, the person who induced someone to commit a crime was treated just 
like the one who committed the crime; Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (1899), pp. 100 sq. 
<41> 
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12.5.6, Ulpian, citing Sabinus and Celsus, generally states that things given to 
someone ex iniusta causa may be recovered with the condictio: 
Ulp. D. 12.5.6 Perpetuo Sabinus probavit veterum 
opinionem existimantium id, quod ex iniusta causa apud 
aliquem sit, posse condici: in qua sententia etiam Celsus est. 
Sabinus always said the early jurists were right in holding 
that the condictio would lie to recover anything that was 
received ex iniusta causa; Celsus shares this view.129 
However, no example is provided in the text to explain what is meant by ex 
iniusta causa.130 In modern law, iniustus is often understood as meaning 
illegal in the sense of breach of legislation, as opposed to immorality or 
turpitude which is seen to be covered by the term ob turpem causam. The 
condictio ob iniustam causam is seen to operate in cases where there has been 
an illegal transfer and the transferor seeks recovery. Crucially, the in pari 
delicto rule is understood not only to bar the recovery of transfers ob turpem 
but also of transfers ob iniustam causam; hence recovery is in principle denied 
where both parties are involved in a transaction prohibited by the law.  
In this chapter, it will be investigated whether classical Roman law 
proceeded on the same understanding and applied the condictio ob iniustam 
causam and the in pari delicto rule where the transaction was illegal. 
In this context, it is useful to ask what was understood by illegal or 
statutorily prohibited transactions in classical Roman law. We will see that, 
depending on the nature of the legislation, the issue of recoverability did not 
always arise. <42> 
 
129 Cf. also in the title on the condictio sine causa Ulp. D. 12.7.1.3 Constat id demum 
posse condici alicui, quod vel non ex iusta causa ad eum pervenit vel redit ad non iustam 
causam. It is agreed that the condictio can only go against someone for something which came 
to him non ex iusta causa or ad non iustam causam. 
130 In his Palingenesia, Lenel suggests as a title for Ulp. lib. XVIII ad Sabinum (which is 
the inscription of D. 12.5.6) De legatis – De usus fructu et usu legato – De usu fructu earum 
rerum, quae usu consumuntur (Legacy – Usufruct and legacy of usufruct and usus – Usufruct 
of those things which have been consumed by use); Lenel, Palingenesia, Vol. II, 1070, 1074. 
Lenel loc. cit. 1075 also connects the fragment with the rule that the condictio is in principle 
not granted to the owner except where the property is in the hands of a thief (condictio ex 
causa furtiva, Kaser, RP I, p. 618). From this, we may conclude that Ulp. D. 12.5.6 does not 
deal with an illegal transfer. <42> 
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I. Legal Prohibitions in Roman Law 
Classical Roman law distinguished between the prohibition of juridical 
transactions, such as sales or donations, and the prohibition of non-juridical 
acts, as, for instance, criminal acts.131  
1. Prohibition of Transactions 
Three kinds of prohibition of transactions were recognised, depending on 
whether the law contained a sanction for its violation: (i) leges perfectae, 
which as a sanction rendered the transaction void, (ii) leges minus quam 
perfectae, which did not provide nullity but penalised the infringement, and 
(iii) leges imperfectae, which neither provided nullity nor penalties.132 Since 
the transaction was valid in the latter two cases, there could be no enrichment 
claim against the recipient.133 In other words, if the transaction had already 
taken place, the giver could not claim back what he gave. In the case of a lex 
minus quam perfecta which penalised the illegal transaction but did not 
declare it void the penalty was intended to have a purely deterrent effect on the 
parties to the transaction134 – the penalty was to make the parties abstain from 
the transaction. The sense of a lex imperfecta was to bar legal enforcement of 
the transaction in question. The praetor denied the actio or granted an exceptio 
if he perceived there to be an infringement of the law.135 One example of a lex 
imperfecta is the lex Cincia de donis et muneribus (204 A.D.)136. According to 
the lex Cincia it was in principle137 forbidden to accept donations which 
exceeded a certain value. The lex Cincia did not provide a sanction regarding a 
donation which exceeded the value allowed; it did not declare this donation 
void. Therefore, if the forbidden donation had been fulfilled the transaction 
was valid; so there was no recovery. However, if the transaction was not yet 
fully carried out and the donee took the donor to court to enforce the 
 
131 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), p. 7. 
132 Following the long accepted view founding on Ulp. ep. (UE) 1, 1. Kaser, 
Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 9 sqq.; idem, RP I, pp. 249 sq.; Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, pp. 697 sq. 
133 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 699. 
134 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 39. 
135 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 27 sqq.; Kaser, RP I, p. 249; Zimmermann, The 
Law of Obligations, pp. 699. 
136 For literature on this lex see Kaser, RP I, p. 602 note 19. 
137 Certain exceptions were made for personae exceptae who were close to the donor, 
Kaser, RP I, p. 602; Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), p. 21. <43> 
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transaction the <43> praetor would help the donor by granting an exceptio138, 
or by denying an actio in the first place139; so the donee could not enforce the 
promise.  
In the case of a lex perfecta, by contrast, the transaction was void. This 
raises the issue of recoverability. However, the fragments which mention an 
iniusta causa (they will be discussed in detail below) are not concerned with 
the infringement of a lex perfecta. Furthermore, the following text which deals 
with the issue of recoverability of money paid contra leges allows recovery 
not on the grounds of an iniusta causa but on the grounds of causa data causa 
non secuta: 
C. 4.6.5 Diocl. et Max. Si militem ad negotium tuum 
procuratorem fecisti, cum hoc legibus interdictum sit, ac 
propter hoc pecuniam ei numerasti, quidquid ob causam 
datum est, causa non secuta restitui tibi competens iudex 
curae habebit. 
If you have employed a soldier as a procurator for your 
business, which is prohibited by the laws, and have paid him 
money on this basis, the learned judge will allow you to 
recover whatever has been given on this cause because it has 
been given for a cause that has not been achieved. 
Tu makes a soldier his procurator, which is forbidden according to the laws. 
On account of the procuratorship, he pays over money to the soldier. Later, he 
claims the money back, and is allowed to recover. Regarding the question at 
issue, this text is notable for two reasons. First, it deals with a payment of 
money made on the basis of an illegal agreement (the appointment of the 
soldier as a procurator). Thus it is likely that the payment was considered to be 
illegal itself since it was made in execution of the illegal agreement. The payer 
seeks, and is allowed, recovery of the money paid to the soldier. The 
possibility of recovery is, however, not explained on the grounds of the soldier 
having the money ob iniustam causam but with reference to the cause 
underlying the transfer that has failed (causa data causa non secuta), meaning 
the invalid appointment. So the text shows that iniusta causa was not a term a 
priori assigned to illegal causes. Secondly, there is no mention of the in pari 
 
138 According to Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 513: an exceptio legis 
Cinciae; see Kaser, RP I, p. 603 note 34 on an exceptio in factum. 
139 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 27 sq. <44> 
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delicto rule here; recovery is allowed and not questioned albeit the transfer is 
actually illegal. There is no hint that the rule was applied to illegal transfers 
lacking turpitude. <44> 
2. Prohibition of Non-Juridical Acts 
Other laws prohibited non-juridical acts, such as criminal acts. If the parties 
came to an agreement that violated the law, for instance an agreement to 
commit a crime, the agreement itself was not valid in the sense of being 
enforceable, since it did not fall within any of the contractual types.140 In 
procedural terms, there was no formula which fitted these circumstances and 
which could have led to a claim to enforce the promise. If one party had 
already paid the other party and now claimed the money back, the issue of 
recovery arose. 
If the parties agreed to an act which infringed criminal law, inevitably 
turpitude must be involved as well since the criminal law is at the very core of 
the moral code. These were therefore cases of illegality which also imported 
turpitude. In this situation, the classical Roman jurists would judge the case 
upon the turpitude involved rather than on the fact that legislation was 
violated.141 This becomes clear from the fragments which, in these situations, 
denote the behaviour as turpis, and operate the rules applying to turpitude.142 
One example is provided by Ulp. D. 12.5.4 pr. which discusses stuprum and 
adultery, acts which were contrary to good morals as well as forbidden by the 
lex Iulia de adulteriis. These are cases of a parallel infringement of morals and 
legislation. The legal prohibitions in such cases are an expression of good 
morals and generally aim to protect them; so morals are the underlying reason 
for the legal consequences provided. Hence, if one party had paid over money 
to evoke a crime, say to make the recipient kill someone, and then he sought to 
recover the money, the condictio would be operated ob turpem causam, and, 
depending on the circumstances, recovery would be barred because of the in 
pari delicto rule (cf. Ulp., Paul. D. 12.5.2 sqq.).143 It is important to note that 
there is no hint that in these cases the Roman jurists spoke of an iniusta causa.  
The classical Roman jurists did not treat an infringement of good morals 
and legislation on an equal basis but distinguished between them144, as in: 
 
140 Honsell, Rückabwicklung (1974), pp. 77 sq. 
141 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 71 sqq. 
142 See above B I 1. 
143 Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), p. 72. 
144 M. Kaser, "Rechtswidrigkeit und Sittenwidrigkeit im klassischen römischen Recht" 
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Marcian. D. 30.112.3 Si quis scripserit testamento fieri, quod 
contra ius est, vel bonos mores, non valet, veluti si quis 
scripserit contra legem aliquid, vel contra edictum praetoris, 
vel etiam turpe aliquid.  
<45> If anyone wrote in his will that something should be 
done contrary to law or good morals, it is invalid, as if 
someone wrote something against legislation or against the 
edict of the praetor, or something immoral. 
Contra ius is distinguished from contra bonos mores. Marcian defined as 
contra ius acts which infringe legislation or the edictum praetoris, whereas 
contra bonos mores is explained as an act which is turpis. The expression 
iniustus, however, is not used to denote an act against the law, neither here nor 
in other fragments referring to behaviour contra leges.145  
The meaning of iniusta causa in the context of the condictio must be 
deduced from the fragments which allow recovery on the grounds of an iniusta 
causa. These fragments will now be analysed. 
II. Fragments Dealing with the Condictio Ex Iniusta Causa 
Only a few fragments that tackle the issue of recovery ex iniusta causa or 
ob iniustam causam have come down to us. Moreover, some of them are 
reported outwith their original context, like Ulp. D. 12.5.6 and idem D. 
12.7.1.3.146 However, there are a few fragments which report cases where the 
condictio was granted because the fact situation was described as involving an 
iniusta causa.  
1. The Case of the Lease of Land 
Ulpian provided the example of fruits which have been reaped after the term 
of tenancy had elapsed: 
Ulp. D. 12.1.4.1 (…) Et fructus ex iniusta causa percepti 
condicendi sunt: nam et si colonus post lustrum completum 
fructus perceperit, condici eos constat ita demum, si non ex 
 
(1940) 60 SZ 95. <45> 
145 Cf., for instance, Marcian. D. 28.7.14; Paul. D. 45.1.35.1; Ulp. D. 2.14.7.7; Paul., 
Sent. 1.1.4 and 3.4b.2; C. 2.3.6. 
146 See above C at note 130. <46> 
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voluntate domini percepti sunt: nam si ex voluntate, procul 
dubio cessat condictio. 
Fruits gathered ex iniusta causa can be claimed with the 
condictio: in the case of a tenant who gathers fruits after his 
term has ended, it is agreed that the condictio lies, at least 
where the gathering is done contrary to the will of the owner. 
If it is done in accordance with his will, then, no doubt, the 
condictio cannot be brought. 
Ulpian stated that the condictio lies where fruits have been reaped ex 
iniusta causa. He then explained when the fruit can be recovered by the 
landowner: if the tenant has <46> reaped them after the lustrum, i.e. the term 
of the tenancy comprising five years147, has elapsed, the condictio lies, but 
only if the tenant has done so without the consent of the landowner. On the 
other hand, if the landowner has permitted the fruit to be reaped after the term 
has elapsed the landowner cannot claim the fruit from the tenant. Within the 
term of the tenancy of an estate, the tenant is allowed to collect and keep the 
fruit which grows on the estate.148 The contract (locatio conductio) imports the 
permission of the landowner to reap the fruit, and a corresponding right of the 
tenant to do so. However, with the end of its term the contract would normally 
lapse, and with it the permission and the right to reap the fruit. Therefore, if 
the colonus reaps the fruit after the contract has come to an end he does so 
without any right. The right to reap the fruit belongs to the landowner. In other 
words, one could say that the tenant infringes the right of the landowner if he 
takes the fruits without permission. According to this interpretation we might 
conclude that the term "ex iniusta causa" is used here to describe a situation 
where a right that is vested in the landowner is encroached upon by the tenant.  
However, this would amount to an interpretation which concludes that 
classical Roman law, in certain fact situations, granted the condictio although 
the benefits had not been transferred by the pursuer but came to the defender 
in another way, for example, by encroachment. Yet the conventional view149 
assumes that the condictio in principle presupposed a datio, that is, a transfer 
between the parties. The only recognised exception would be the condictio ex 
 
147 Kaser, RP I, p. 568 note 47. 
148 Kaser, RP I, p. 565. 
149 Cf. Schwarz, Condictio (1952), pp. 1 sq., with further reference. But see also D. 
Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: N. MacCormick/P. Birks 
(eds.), The Legal Mind – Essays for Tony Honoré (1986), 163 (pp. 170 sqq.). 
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furtiva, which was granted against the thief of money or goods – where the 
defender has stolen the goods there has obviously been no transfer.  
This thesis cannot fully examine the complex question whether classical 
Roman law also granted the condictio in cases where the pursuer sought to 
recover benefits which came to the defender other than by transfer (datio).150 
However, stated with the proviso that the question cannot be fully answered 
here, the fact situations reported in the fragments that give the condictio on the 
grounds of an iniusta causa do seem to <47> resemble encroachment 
situations more than deliberate transfer cases. Taking the example of the lease 
of land again, there is in fact no contract and no permission to reap the fruits 
after the term of the lease has elapsed, and thus no basis for a deliberate 
transfer or datio. A transfer might possibly be construed if one recurs to the 
fiction that the lease, and with it the consent of the landowner, continues 
beyond the term. In Roman law, the contract of locatio conductio is assumed 
to be prolonged where the parties tacitly carry on with the contract after the 
lustrum has elapsed.151 This, however, is a fiction152: the contract has in fact 
come to an end after five years, and the parties have not explicitly agreed to its 
renewal. A careful reading of the text of Ulpian rather speaks in favour of the 
view that there is no deliberate transfer here: he explicitly spoke of fruits 
which are taken not transferred, and the decisive factor for granting the 
condictio is the lack of authorization (voluntas) of the landowner. It seems to 
be the unauthorized taking of the fruit, and hence the act of encroachment by 
the tenant himself, which leads to his enrichment, and which triggers the 
condictio.  
Yet, some difficulties remain. For example, why was the condictio not 
granted on the grounds of a furtum, a theft of the tenant? Was the fictitiously 
prolonged contract sufficient to exclude a furtum? And why is it not the rei 
vindicatio that is the appropriate remedy to recover the fruits? A parallel case 
in the Codex may explain.153 In this case, a mala fide possessor is liable under 
the rei vindicatio to return the reaped fruits as long as they still exist. Only if 
the fruits have already been consumed does the condictio lie. A mala fide 
possessor hence does not acquire title by gathering the fruits. From this we 
may conclude that in our case the tenant was bona fide. Apparently he did not 
realize that the contract had ended and that he had no right to reap the fruits 
 
150 This examination will be provided by the forthcoming doctoral thesis of Sonja Heine, 
Freiburg, Germany. <47> 
151 Ulp. D. 19.2.13.11; Kaser, RP I, p. 568. 
152 Ulp. D. 19.2.13.11 (…) reconduxisse videri (…) consensisse videntur (…). 
153 C. 4.9.3. <48> 
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anymore; so he acquired title bona fide. In that case, there is neither a furtum 
nor does the rei vindicatio lie. So, there neither seems to be an encroachment 
that amounts to a theft nor, where the fruits were taken without the will of the 
landowner, a deliberate transfer.  
These questions cannot be pursued further here. For our purposes, at least, 
it suffices to note that the fragment speaks of an iniusta causa but is not 
concerned with any breach of legislation or illegal transfer. It seems to be a 
situation where the private right (ownership) of a person is infringed. The 
tenant benefits from the encroachment since <48> he has got the fruits. But 
since he has acquired them ex iniusta causa, without any authorization to reap 
them, he is liable under the condictio to return the fruits to the landowner. 
2. The Actio Rerum Amotarum 
Another fragment that grants the condictio on the grounds of an iniusta causa 
is: 
Marcian. D. 25.2.25 Rerum quidem amotarum iudicium sic 
habet locum, si divortii consilio res amotae fuerint et 
secutum divortium fuerit. sed si in matrimonio uxor marito 
res subtraxerit, licet cessat rerum amotarum actio, tamen 
ipsas res maritus condicere potest: nam iure gentium condici 
puto posse res ab his, qui non ex iusta causa possident. 
The actio rerum amotarum is available where things were 
removed so as to obtain a divorce, and the divorce actually 
took place. But if the wife takes away her husband's property 
during the marriage, although the actio rerum amotarum 
does not lie, the husband can bring a condictio to recover his 
property; for I hold that in accordance with the ius gentium, 
property can be recovered by a condictio from people who 
do not possess it ex iusta causa. 
The actio rerum amotarum was a praetorian claim which was granted in cases 
where the wife, in expectation of a divorce, had removed goods from her 
husband's patrimony. After the divorce, the husband could claim what was his 
with the actio rerum amotarum. If the divorce did not take place, the actio 
rerum amotarum was not available since the prerequisites of the claim were 
not met. However, in this case Marcian gave the condictio because the wife 
possesses the goods non ex iusta causa. A similar fragment provides: 
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Aristo-Paul. D. 25.2.6.4 Sed si morte mariti solutum sit 
matrimonium, heres mariti hereditatis petitione vel ad 
exhibendum actione eas consequi poterit. 1. Aristo et condici 
ei posse recte putat, quia ex iniusta causa apud eam essent. 
Where the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, 
his heir can recover the property by the hereditatis petitio or 
an actio ad exhibendum. 1. Aristo rightly thinks he can bring 
a condictio against the widow, because she holds the assets 
ex iniusta causa. 
In the principium, Paulus stated that the heir of a deceased husband can claim 
the assets from the widow with the hereditatis petitio and with the actio ad 
exhibendum. The hereditatis petitio resembled the rei vindicatio and was 
brought by the heir who succeeded to the ownership of the deceased against 
someone who claimed to be, but was not, an heir. An actio ad exhibendum 
was granted by the praetor where the rei <49> vindicatio could not lie for 
procedural reasons (because the defender denied co-operation at the litis 
contestatio).154 Then, citing Aristo, Paulus additionally gave the heir the 
condictio, reasoning that the assets are held by the widow ex iniusta causa. 
Since the hereditatis petitio lay against someone who is not an heir155, the case 
presupposes that the widow has not become the heir of her husband. 
Therefore, she has no right to the assets she retains.  
The question may again be raised whether in these two cases the terms ex 
iniusta causa or non ex iusta causa should be interpreted as describing a 
situation in which the possessor has infringed another's private right when 
acquiring the goods he retains. In these cases, it is clear that there has been no 
transfer of the benefits from husband to wife; instead, the wife has seized the 
goods. A further question which then immediately arises is why the condictio 
was not granted ex furtiva. However, the condictio ex causa furtiva did not lie 
between marriage partners; a theft (furtum) was seen to be excluded because 
of the close community of marriage partners.156  
"Ex iniusta causa" has been understood simply to denote a general 
expression for the fact that there is no just cause to retain the benefit.157 
 
154 Kaser, RP I, pp. 104 sq.; 433 sq. 
155 Kaser, RP I, pp. 104 sq. 
156 Kaser, RP I, p. 618 f.; Wacke, Actio Rerum Amotarum (1963), p. 108. 
157 Wacke, Actio Rerum Amotarum (1963), p. 110. Cf. also Schwarz, Condictio (1952), 
pp. 275 sqq., who interprets ex iniusta causa as a general category which was created in order 
to embrace cases which did not fit unter the special headings of indebitum, ob rem, etc. 
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However, ex iniusta causa seems to have been used in a more particular sense 
in classical Roman law. The term ex iusta causa can be found in the context of 
rules on acquisition of title. In classical Roman law, a possessor could acquire 
title by way of usucapio (positive prescription) after a certain prescription 
period had elapsed. However, this presupposed that the possession was 
qualified by a iusta causa possessionis (so-called possessio civilis). Only if the 
possessor possessed ex iusta causa could he acquire title.158 An example 
would be a buyer (emptor) who has bought an estate from the owner without 
complying with the formal prerequisites of the mancipatio.159 Since the form 
of the mancipatio was not used, the buyer did not acquire title. However, the 
rules of usucapio apply since he possesses pro emptore, and ex iusta causa: 
possession was transferred under a contract which was merely lacking a 
formal condition, and was not seized without authorization. By contrast, a 
iusta causa cannot come into being where <50> the goods are captured in an 
unauthorized manner.160 The possessor then possesses ex iniusta causa. This 
has two consequences: title cannot be acquired by positive prescription, and 
the possessor is liable to return the seized goods.  
In the case of the wife seizing goods of her husband's without his 
authorization, she possesses ex iniusta causa. So, she cannot acquire title by 
positive prescription, and she has to return the seized goods. Again, it seems to 
be a situation in which the possessor has infringed a private right of another 
without permission and has thereby come into possession. If the prerequisites 
of the special actio rerum amotarum were not met the Roman jurists granted 
the condictio to enable the husband to recover.  
The most important fact, however, is again to note that these cases do not 
deal with any breach of legal prohibition. Neither are the goods illegally 
transferred from one party to the other; they come to the hands of the wife by 
her seizing them. 
3. The Case of Marital Donations 
The condictio is granted ex iniusta causa in yet another context: it is the case 
of a donation between marriage partners. This case is particularly interesting 
since such a donation was prohibited by law. Ulpian wrote: 
 
158 Kaser, RP I, p. 386. 
159 Cf. above, note 95. <50> 
160 Kaser, loc. cit. <51> 
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Ulp. D. 24.1.5.18 In donationibus autem iure civile impeditis 
hactenus revocatur donum ab eo ab eave cui donatum est, 
ut, si quidem exstet res, vindicetur, si consumpta sit, 
condicatur hactenus, quatenus locupletior quis eorum factus 
est: 
As regards gifts which are prohibited by civil law, a gift can 
be revoked, and if the property involved still exists, it can be 
reclaimed from the man or woman to whom it was given. If 
it has been consumed, a condictio will lie to recover the 
amount by which either of them was enriched: 
Gaius added in the following fragment: 
Gai. D. 24.1.6 – quia quod ex non concessa donatione 
retinetur, id aut sine causa, aut ex iniusta causa retineri 
intelligitur; ex quibus causis condictio nasci solet. 
– because something which is retained on the basis of a gift 
which is not permitted is held to be retained sine causa or ex 
iniusta causa; on these causae there is usually the condictio. 
The prohibition was not expressed in the form of statutory legislation but by 
customary law which was founded on the Roman mores.161 It rendered the 
transfer <51> invalid, so normally the rei vindicatio operated to claim the gift 
back. If the gift had been consumed, however, the condictio lay to recover the 
enrichment.  
At first sight, this case seems to differ from the others in two respects. 
First, there has clearly been a transfer of the gift between the marriage 
partners. Second, the transfer is forbidden by law, and thus illegal. Therefore, 
the question arises whether ex iniusta causa here denotes an illegal transfer 
where the condictio is given to recover benefits which have been illegally 
transferred. However, on closer investigation the case can again be interpreted 
as a situation where the donee infringes a private right of the donor. Ulpian 
tells us that the donation normally triggers the rei vindicatio since the transfer 
is rendered void. Only if the donee consumes the gift is the condictio granted. 
The consumption itself, however, is not a transfer but a deliberate act of the 
donee. Due to the consumption the rei vindicatio ceases since the owner loses 
 
161 Ulp. D. 24.1.1; Kaser, Verbotsgesetze (1977), pp. 114 sq. 
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title to the consumed goods. The consumption, therefore, may be interpreted 
as an infringement of the owner's property rights. 
Again, the Gaius-fragment that deals with the prohibition of marital 
donations had probably in mind the unauthorized consumption of the gift 
when speaking of ex iniusta causa, not the illegality of the transfer of the gift. 
However, this differentiation is quite subtle. It is therefore possible that this 
fragment in particular has induced the association of iniusta causa with illegal 
transfers. For Roman law, however, it is not true that the condictio was 
generally granted ex iniusta causa in cases of illegality. C. 4.6.5 provides the 
proof since, as will be recalled, money was illegally transferred and could be 
recovered on the grounds of causa data causa non secuta.162 The other 
fragments dealing with recovery ex iniusta causa might be explained on the 
grounds that the possessor came into possession by infringing a private right 
of the pursuer without the latter's authorization. At least it may be said that 
those fragments do not deal with transfers in breach of any legislation. 
4. Illegal Transfers and the In Pari Delicto Rule 
Another crucial point to observe is that none of the fragments which deal 
with a condictio ex iniusta causa mention the in pari delicto rule. In the 
fragments which do not concern illegal transfers this finding is not surprising 
since there is prima facie no reason to bar recovery. More interesting in this 
context is the case of marital donations. <52> As we have seen, this case is 
best explained on the grounds of encroachment upon ownership due to 
consumption; and according to this interpretation, there again is no illegal 
transfer as far as the condictio and not the rei vindicatio is concerned. 
However, even if we assume that the condictio ex iniusta causa is granted here 
on the grounds that the transfer of the donation is illegal, which must be 
doubted due to the reasons laid out above, still one thing may be said: the in 
pari delicto rule was not applied to this case. Not only is the rule not 
mentioned; it would not make any sense to apply it. The reason is that an 
application of the rule would achieve a result opposite to the aim of the law, 
namely to prohibit the transfer of property between the partners163: the donee 
could have kept the benefits.  
There is consequently no indication in the Digest that the in pari delicto 
rule was applied where the parties were involved in purely illegal transactions 
 
162 See above C I 1. <52> 
163 Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), pp. 347 sq.; Kaser, RP I, 
pp. 331 sq. 
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which did not, at the same time, import turpitude. All examples of the in pari 
delicto rule given in the Digest deal with immoral, not merely illegal, 
transactions.164 Neither is there any hint that the involvement in an illegal 
transaction alone was regarded as being turpis in classical Roman law.165 The 
text in the Codex concerning an illegal payment of money (C. 4.6.5) gives the 
condictio causa data causa non secuta to enable the pursuer to recover; the 
question whether recovery should be barred by the in pari delicto rule is not 
raised. Transfers that were merely illegal were recoverable. Any extension of 
the in pari delicto rule to cases where the parties have infringed legislation 
without turpitude being involved must have occurred at a later date. <53> 
D. POSTCLASSICAL DEVELOPMENT 
I. The Development of the Distinct Condictiones  
1. The Formation of Distinct Claims 
In postclassical times, the formulary system was abolished and replaced by the 
postclassical civil procedure (cognitio). In this procedure, the action was no 
longer tied to the existence of a formula but was rather understood to be a 
substantive claim whose prerequisites were investigated by the judge.166 As a 
consequence of the abolition of the condictio as a procedural formula, the 
jurists in the Eastern Roman Empire developed fixed and distinct claims of 
condictiones by taking up the classical division of cases in which the actio 
certae creditae pecuniae or certae rei had been granted. The Justinianic law 
commission then based the related titles in the Digest and the Codex on these 
claims which were named condictio indebiti, condictio causa data causa non 
secuta (the former condictio ob rem), condictio furtiva, and condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam; moreover a claim called condictio sine causa 
was added which was a claim for recovery of something that was with the 
recipient without a legal basis, as well as a condictio ex lege for cases where 
an obligation was introduced by a nova lex. The difference from classical 
 
164 J.K. Grodecki, "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis" (1955) 71 LQR 254 (p. 
256). 
165 Cf. H.H. Seiler, "§ 817 S. 2 und das römische Recht", in: Festschrift für Wilhelm 
Felgentraeger (1969), 379 (p. 389). <53> 
166 Cf. Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 517 sqq.; E. Metzger, "Actions", in: E. Metzger (ed.), A 
Companion to Justinian's Institutes (1998), 208 (pp. 216 sq.). 
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Roman law was that now each condictio formed independent claims with 
distinct prerequisites.167  
2. The Change of the Contractual System 
During the following legal development, the fate of the various condictiones 
took different directions. Broadly stated, the condictio indebiti took priority 
amongst them, while the other condictiones declined in importance. The 
reason for this development lay in the change of the contractual system. The 
classical system of fixed contractual types was, step by step, dissolved, and 
eventually displaced by the principle of contractual freedom. 
a) In classical Roman times, the number of enforceable contracts was 
limited due to the formulary procedure.168 Only if there was a formula that 
provided a remedy for the pursuer's demand for counter-performance was 
there a contract. If there was no formula, there was no claim for counter-
performance. Where the pursuer had already <54> performed in order to 
obtain counter-performance (datio ob rem), all the pursuer could do was to 
claim back his own performance with the condictio ob rem.  
b) However, sometimes there were cases in which it was not clear under 
which formula an agreement could be subsumed. One example is a transaction 
called aestimatum.169 Goods of one party were left with the other, and their 
value was estimated. After a certain time, the recipient of the goods either had 
to pay the estimated sum to the owner or to return the goods. This transaction 
enabled the recipient to try to sell the goods. If he managed to do so, and 
obtained a price higher than the estimated sum, the surplus was his. If he failed 
to sell the property, the owner could vindicate from him. Thus the aestimatum 
contained elements of several contractual types, mainly emptio venditio and 
locatio conductio.170 It was therefore uncertain which formula applied to this 
case. On the other hand, equity demanded enforceability since the elements of 
recognised contracts were implied. In order to save the pursuer from losing the 
case only because of these technical problems the praetor granted an actio in 
factum.171 It was an action "on the facts of the case", and closely related to an 
existing formula.172 So in the example of the aestimatum, after a description of 
 
167 Kaser, RP II, pp. 422 sqq.; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 839. 
168 See above A II 1. <54>  
169 Cf. Ulp. D. 19.3.1 pr. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 535 sq.; Kaser, RP I, 
p. 581. 
170 Ulpian, loc.cit., also discusses mandatum and societas. 
171 Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), pp. 341 sq. 
172 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 533; Kaser, RP I, p. 582; Honsell/Mayer-
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the facts of the case in the demonstratio, the actio de aestimato resembled the 
formulae of emptio venditio and locatio conductio in that its wording also ran 
dare oportere ex fide bona.  
In introducing new formulae the praetor widened the range of enforceable 
agreements. The consequence was a considerable relaxation in the law of 
contracts.173 It is certain that in classical times actiones in factum were granted 
in cases that involved elements from different typical contractual types. 
According to the ruling opinion, actiones in factum also were acknowledged in 
some cases of a datio ob rem, that is in cases of atypical agreements174. Only 
later development, however, brought about the systematic recognition of 
enforceability in these cases.175 <55> 
c) In postclassical times, actiones in factum (praescriptis verbis agere) 
were generally recognised as remedies by which the pursuer could claim 
counter-performance in all cases of a (former) datio ob rem. Thus, by the time 
of Justinian, a new type of contract had in fact come to be recognised: the so-
called innominate real contracts.176 This category contained all agreements 
that did not fall within the classical types of contracts. Therefore, the pursuer 
now had the choice between claiming counter-performance with an actio 
praescriptis verbis or recovering what he himself had performed with the 
condictio ob rem.177 However, such an agreement only became enforceable 
when the pursuer had already yielded performance. In that respect it resembled 
the classical real contract, and this is where its name derived from.178 But the 
decisive difference from the latter was that the pursuer in classical times only 
had a claim to recover what he had given. He could not claim counter-
performance.179 
The recognition of the innominate real contracts initiated the decline of the 
condictio ob rem. Since counter-performance was now enforceable, the 
condictio ob rem was not necessary any more to protect the pursuer who had 
 
Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), p. 342. 
173 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 534. 
174 Cf. Aristo/Iul./Ulp. D. 2.14.7.2. 
175 Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), p. 342; Zimmermann, The 
Law of Obligations, p. 534. <55> 
176 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 532 sqq.; Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), 
pp. 378 sqq.; Kaser, RP II, pp. 419 sq. 
177 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 858. 
178 Kaser, RP II, p. 421; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 534. 
179 Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), pp. 379 sq. note 5. 
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performed first. Although it still existed, the change in the contractual system 
deprived the condictio ob rem of its original importance.180  
d) Since the condictio ob turpem causam was also based on a datio ob 
rem, the question arises whether it also lost its function due to the 
development of the new contractual type. The innominate real contracts, 
however, were different from the cases of a datio ob rem inhonestam, in that 
they were enforceable. Enforceability, of course, was undesirable if the 
agreement imported turpitude. The decline of the condictio ob turpem causam 
probably began a considerable time later and was connected with the final 
recognition of contractual freedom. The final step assuming the existence of a 
contract as soon as there was a consent was seemingly taken by the French 
humanists, who abandoned the Roman principle "nuda pactio obligationem 
non parit" (mere consent does not produce an obligation). The principle was 
indeed reported until the seventeenth century, but from about the eighteenth 
century there was no longer any <56> dispute that pure consent created an 
obligation ("ex nudo pacto oritur actio").181 This was the moment when the 
condictio indebiti or sine causa182 began to supersede the condictio ob turpem 
causam. If the parties consented to an immoral transaction, they were now 
seen to conclude a contract; albeit one that was invalid. Their agreement was 
no longer conceived as lying outwith contract. So if a performance was made 
under such an agreement it was made solvendi causa, i.e. with the purpose to 
discharge the obligation under the contract. Therefore, the condictio indebiti 
(sine causa) could now operate to claim back what was given in performance 
of this contract that was void and that did not provide a legal basis.183 Due to 
this development, the condictio ob turpem causam weakened in significance. 
However, the condictio ob turpem causam was received into the ius commune 
along with the other condictiones from the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and for long 
continued to be discussed and operated as a claim to recover what was given 
for a shameful cause.184 
 
180 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 858. <56> 
181 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 539, with further reference. 
182 Depending on the scope and elaboration of these claims; see the following Chapters 
Three, Four and Six as to the development in the different countries discussed in this thesis. 
183 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 860 sq. 
184 Cf. Chapter Two. 
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II. The Link between the Condictio ob Turpem Causam and the Condictio 
ob Iniustam Causam in the Digest 
Comparing the Digest with the Codex on the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam, a striking difference may be noticed: while in the Digest the condictio 
ob turpem and ob iniustam causam are brought together under the same title, 
and have been amalgamated into one term "condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam", in the Codex the two types of case are treated separately. The title C. 
4.7 deals with the condictio ob turpem causam; here we find cases ob turpem 
causam as well as the in pari delicto rule. After C. 4.8, where the condictio 
furtiva is discussed, in C. 4.9 the condictio ob iniustam causam appears. 
However, it only appears in the title, which runs De condictione ex lege et sine 
causa vel iniusta causa. The texts of the constitutions in this title do not 
mention these terms any more. C. 4.9.1 deals with a case in which the 
condictio is used to claim back a loan even before the term of loan has 
elapsed; the fragment does not deal with a case of unjustified enrichment (the 
loan is valid), and hence is not our concern.185 The second fragment of this 
title states that a legal instrument which is invalid may be claimed from the 
creditor. In the third text, C. 4.9.3, <57> the condictio is granted for the 
recovery of fruits which were drawn and consumed by a mala fide possessor 
who knew he had no right to consume the fruits. This text, as we may 
conclude from parallel fragments in the Digest (see above C II 1), probably 
deals with a case ob iniustam causam. Finally, in C. 4.9.4, the pursuer is 
allowed to claim back a security given for a loan which was never paid out to 
the pursuer. Again, it is crucial to note that none of these texts deals with the 
violation of any legislation.  
The Digest was compiled after the Codex had already been published;186 
therefore the combination of the cases ob iniustam causam with ob turpem 
causam must be later than their combination with sine causa. The reasons for 
this systematic change can only be guessed at187, all the more since the one 
 
185 Cf. A II 1 b to the use of the condictio to claim back a loan. <57> 
186 Honsell/Mayer-Maly/Selb, Römisches Recht (4th ed., 1987), p. 46 with literature. 
187 Cf. also D. 12.7.5 De condictione sine causa, where a case is discussed which seems 
to concern a turpis causa, and which might therefore have been compiled in D. 12.5. 
However, according to the reasoning of Paulus it could be seen as a case of sine causa 
(although the classification sine causa was probably postclassical): non turpem causam...: non 
enim stupri, sed matrimonii gratia datam esse. The marriage, as a causa, never took place. 
One could reason that therefore the dowry money in question here was given sine causa. This 
might have been the reason for the law commission to file the text under this title. For a 
discussion of D. 12.7.5.1 see B II. 
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fragment actually appearing under the title De condictione ob turpem vel 
iniustam causam does not give a practical example but only makes the general 
statement that what is retained ex iniusta causa may be recovered with the 
condictio. A further finding is that, in the Digest, fragments in which an 
iniusta or non iusta causa is mentioned in the context of the condictio are 
mostly scattered between the different books of the Digest concerning the 
condictio, with one further mention in the book on marital donations. They are 
not systematically gathered under the title De condictione ob turpem vel 
iniustam causam. 
It has been suggested188 that the condictio ob iniustam causam might have 
increased in importance after Theodosius II had turned every statutory 
prohibition into a lex perfecta in his lex non dubium (439 A.D.).189 Due to this 
provision, infringement of the law generally rendered a contract invalid. 
However, nowhere does the lex non dubium mention the condictio ob 
iniustam causam or cases which could be related to it. The cases mentioned in 
Nov. Theod. 9 concern the provision that there is no action to enforce a 
contract if the contract is <58> illegal, but there is no case concerning the 
recovery of benefits already transferred. The suggestion190 that Theodosius II 
made use of the condictio ob iniustam causam where a lex perfecta was 
violated fails to provide any proof. On the contrary, given that there is no clear 
hint in the later Digest or the Codex that the condictio ob iniustam causam was 
operated at all in cases of statutory violations it is difficult to imagine how the 
provision of Theodosius II could have affected the condictio ob iniustam 
causam. In the Codex, which was compiled long after the lex non dubium had 
been enacted, the condictio causa data causa non secuta is reported as a claim 
to recover illegally paid money (C. 4.6.5).191 Looking at the cases where the 
condictio is operated on the grounds of an iniusta causa, the condictio ob 
iniustam causam rather seems to denote cases of encroachment on the private 
rights of the pursuer. This might explain why Justinian's law commission 
associated the condictio ob iniustam causam with the condictio ob turpem 
 
188 D. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: N. 
MacCormick/P. Birks (eds.), The Legal Mind – Essays for Tony Honoré (1986), 163 (pp. 175 
sq.); Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 845 sq. note 77. 
189 Nov. Theod. 9 / C. 1.14.5.1 ...hoc est ut ea quae lege fieri prohibentur, si fuerint facta, 
non solum inutilia, sed pro infectis etiam habeantur, licet legis lator fieri prohibuerit tantum 
nec specialiter dixerit inutile esse debere quod factum est. <58> 
190 D. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: N. 
MacCormick/P. Birks (eds.), The Legal Mind – Essays for Tony Honoré (1986), 163 (pp. 175 
sq.). 
191 Above C I 1. <59> 
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causam in book 12.5 of the Digest. For to encroach on another person's right 
may, at least if it is done intentionally, be regarded as blameworthy behaviour.  
Even if the reasoning of the law commission may only be guessed at, the 
association of the condictio ob turpem causam and ob iniustam causam under 
one title in the Digest was an important step. It provided the basis on which 
later jurists understood the law after the full text of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
had been rediscovered in the Middle Ages. The starting point for their 
interpretation of iniusta causa was its association with turpis causa, and with 
the in pari delicto rule which was dealt with in the very same title. In the 
following chapter, an attempt will be made to explain why "iniusta causa" 
came to be understood as "illegal cause", and why the in pari delicto rule was 
expressly applied to it. <59> 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The condictio ob turpem causam operated in cases where a transfer was made 
on a shameful cause outwith the fixed types of contracts. Examples given in 
the Digest refer to cases where the recipient demanded payment to prevent 
him from committing criminal or sacrilegious acts, or to cases where the 
transferor claimed back money which the recipient had extorted from him. The 
decisive criterion for granting recovery ob turpem causam was the turpitude 
involved on the side of the recipient; this being so, the condictio operated 
whether the immoral purpose had been achieved or not. Infringement of 
morals and of legal prohibitions could coincide especially where legislation 
protected morals. However, it was not the breach of legislation as such which 
was considered by the jurists concerning the question of recovery; they were 
silent on this issue. Decisive for the rules on the condictio ob turpem causam 
was the turpitude involved.  
The in pari delicto rule barred recovery where both parties took part in the 
turpitude. Examples named in the Digest concern adultery, indecency, and 
criminal purposes. The bar to recovery was a procedural rule to solve the 
dilemma that a tainted pursuer comes to court and claims tainted gains from a 
tainted defender. This situation was conceived by the Roman jurists to be 
analogous to the situation where a pursuer claims possession of a thing to 
which the defender in possession has an equal right. Here, the rule was 
established that the pursuer had to present a stronger right of possession than 
the defender in order to succeed; where he could only present an equally 
strong right, the parties were in pari causa, and possession was accordingly 
left with the defender. Similarly, where both parties were equally to blame 
regarding the turpitudinous transfer of benefits, they were held to be in pari 
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causa: the pursuer, having transferred ownership of the benefits, could not 
present a stronger right to get them back than the defender to keep them. 
Where the turpitude was only on the side of the defender, the stronger right of 
the pursuer to have the benefits is based on the fact that he did not deliberately 
transfer ownership but was forced to do so by the tainted conduct of the 
defender. In that case, the benefits should clearly belong in the pursuer's 
patrimony; so recovery was granted ob turpem causam. Where the pursuer 
himself was to blame, however, the judge could not decide who, according to 
justice, should have the <60> benefits. Therefore, the judge did not alter the 
current state of possession but left the benefits with the current possessor. 
The condictio ob iniustam causam was, in classical Roman law, not 
specially concerned with the recovery of illegal transactions. There is, 
furthermore, no indication that the in pari delicto rule was applied to cases ob 
iniustam causam. Rather, the condictio ob iniustam causam seems to have 
denoted cases where the defender has encroached upon another person's right 
and made gains therefrom. However, the link of the condictio ob iniustam 
causam with the condictio ob turpem causam and the in pari delicto rule in the 
Digest brought the two claims together and was one reason for the modern 
understanding of iniusta causa as denoting illegal transfers which are also 
barred by the in pari delicto rule. This theme will be developed in the next 
chapter. 
